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NOTATION 
We respectfully direct the Court's attention to the 
fact that Exhibits 3, 4 and 5 are the verbatim trans-
cripts of proceedings of the hearings before the 
Defendant-Appellant Union's Trial Board at the Statler 
Hotel in Los Angeles, California, on June 3, 4 and 7, 
1954. Those proceedings are reprinted in full in the 
Appendix tendered to the Court with this brief. 
Accordingly, whenever reference is made to Exhibits 
3, 4 or 5, the Court may, for the purpose of conveni-
ence, refer directly to the Appendix to our brief, 
rather than search through the official papers in the 
record for those exhibits. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
THE FORM OF THE RECORD 1 
~ATURE OF THE CASE ------------------------------------- 2 
INTRODUCTION -------------------------------------------- 7 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------ 8 
The Grounds or Motives for Preferring Charges Against Han-
ley and Nance -------------------------------------------- 9 
The Preparation of the Charges ---------------------------- 12 
The Attempts to Hold Trials ------------------------------- 13 
The Trials are Recessed to be Held in Absentia ------------- 18 
The Trial Board's Last Chance Offer to Stand Trial on Tues-
day, June 8, 1954 ---------------------------------------- 19 
The Conspiracy of Hanley, Nance, Ni·chols and Fuller to Sabo-
tage the Trials ------------------------------------------- 20 
The Trials in Absentia ------------------------------------ 21 
The Appeals of Hanley and Nance -------------------------- 22 
Failure to Include New or Refuting Evidence in the Formal 
Appeals ------------------------------------------------- 23 
The Alleged Political Conspiracy to Expel Nance and Hanley__ 25 
STATEMENT OF POINT·S ON APPEAL----------------------- 26 
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------- 30 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS-RE-
SPONDENTS WERE WRONGFULLY EJCPELLED FROM MEM-
BERSHIP IN DEPENDANT-APPELLANT UNION, AND THAT 
THEIR EXPULSIONS ARE NULL AND VOID ---------------- 30 
A. The Court Erred as a Matter of Law in Finding and Con-
cluding that the Plaintiffs-Respondents Did not Refuse to 
Stand Trial and That the Trials In Absentia Violated Their 
Rights Under the Constitution of Defendant-Appellant 
Union and the Law Forbidding the Taking of Property 
Without Due Process of Law ------------------------- 30 
The Elements of Due Process Required for Union Trials 3& 
The Trial in Absentia Was Not Illegal Per Se ---------- 35 
I 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Trials May be Concluded in the Absence of a Party in 
Courts of Law --------------------------------------- 37 
The trials in Absentia Were Justified Under Defendant-
Appellant Union's Constitution ------------------------- 4G 
Nance and Hanley Were Not Entitled to any Relief Be-
cause They Did Not Come Bfore the Court with Clean 
Hands ------- -------------------------------------'---- 41 
POINT I 
B. The Court Erred As a Matter of Law In Concluding That 
Plaintiffs-Respondents' Remedies Upon Appeal Through 
Defendant-Appellant Union's Tribunals Was Inadequate 
and Did Not Cure the Alleged Defects of the Trial Board 
Proceedings Below_____________________________________ 43 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS OF 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT UNION AND SOME OF ITS OF-
FICERS WERE MALICIOUS, ARBITRARY, AND UNREASON~ 
ABLE IN CONNECTION WITH THE PREFERRING OF CHARG-
ES, TRIAL PROCEEDINGS, AND APPE'AL THROUGH THE 
UNION TRIBUNALS ----------------------------------------=-- 45 
The Court Erred in Finding that the Charges were Not 
Preferred in Good Faith ------------------------------- 46 
The Court Erred in Finding That the Members of the Trial 
Committee Were Unduly Influenced in the Conduct of the 
Trial Proceedings and in Their Decision by a Desire to 
Cooperate with President Byron in his Efforts to Expel 
Hanley and Nance ------------------------------------- 4~ 
The Remaining Findings of Bad Faith and Unreasonable-
ness in Connection with the Trials in Absentia and Ap-
peals Are Mere Additional Inferences Drawn from the 
Facts ------------------------------------------------ 50 
POINT III 
THE COURT EiRRED IN HOLDING THAT PUNITIVE (EXEM-
PLARY) DAMAGES SHOULD BE AWARDED FOR PLAIN-
TIFFS-REISPONDENTS' WRONGFUL EXPULSIONS FROM UN-
ION MEMBE'RSHIP AND FURTHER ERRED IN AMERCING 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT UNION WITH PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES FOR MISCONDUCT OF ITS OFFICER'S IN THE AB-
S!ENCE OF A SHOWING OF RATIFICATION BY THE UNION 
OF SUCH ALLEGED WANTON OR MALI,CIOUS CONDUCT____ 51 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
..A. The Court Erred As a Matter of Law In Allowing Puni-
tive Damages in Mandamus and Injunction Proceedings__ 51 
B. The Court Erred As a Matter of Law In Allowing Puni-
tive Damages For A Breach of Contract --------------- 5~ 
C. The Court Erred in Not Submitting the Issue of Punitive 
Damages to the Jury, If They Were Allowable__________ 54 
D. Even If Punitive Damages Were Allowable the Court Erred 
in Assessing them Against Defendant-Appellant Union in 
Absence of a Finding that the Malice or Bad Faith of the 
Union Officers was Known to or Ratified by the Mem-
bership ---------------------------------------------- 55 
E. It was Error for the Court to Award Nominal Damages· 
after the Jury Returned a Verdict that No Compensatory 
Damages Were Suffered by Either of the Plaintiffs-Re-· 
spondents -------------------------------------------- 59 
F. It Was Error for the Trial Court to Award Punitive Dam-
ages Without Having an Award of Compensatory Damages 
Upon Which to Base It ------------------------------- 61 
G. The Award of Punitive Damages is 'Ekroneous Because It is 
Wholly Dis·proportionate to the Nominal Award ---------·- 6~ 
POINT VI 
THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AND THE 
POWER TO ENFOHCE A WRIT OF MANDATE OR A MANDA-
TORY INJUNCTION AGAINST A NON-RESIDENT UNINCOR-
PORATED LABOR ASSOCIATION ~COMPE1LLING SUCH ASSO-
CIATION TO REINSTATE PLAINTIF'F.S-RESPONDENTS 64 
POINT Vll 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN REFUSING 
TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCE1SS AND DISMISS ACTIONS 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT UNION IS NOT SUB-
JECT TO PROCESS IN THE STATE OF UTAH ---------------- 64 
A. Defendant-Appellant Union Was Not, And Is Not, Subject 
to Service of Process in the State of Utah Since None of 
the Acts Complained of by Plaintiffs-Respondents Arose 
Out of any Business Transacted by Defendant-Appellant 
Union in the State of Utah ----------------------- _____ 64 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN ALJJOWING 
EACH OF THE PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS TO RECOVER 
THEIR ATTORNEYS FEES AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPEL-
LANT UNION --------------------------------------------- 67 
Ill 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT IX Page 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN TAXING 
CERTAIN COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPE'LLANT UN-
ION ------------------------------------------------------------ 69 
CONCLUSION ----------------------------------------------- 71 
TEXTS 
15 American Jurisprudence 442 -------------------------------- 53 
15 American Jurisprudence 550 -------------------------------- 67 
15 American Jurisprudence 709 ___________ _:____________________ 53 
20 American Jurisprudence 224 -------------------------------- 47 
34 American Jurisprudence 829 -------------------------------- 52 
53 American Jurisprudence 167-168 ---------------------------- 55 
17 A.L.R. 2d 527 --------------------------------------------- 61 
17 A.L.R. 2d 542-545 ------------------------------------------ 61 
17 A.L.R. 2d 548-549 ----------------------------------------- 62 
48 A.L.R. 2d 948, 950 ----------------------------------------- 52 
32 California Jurisprudence 2d 119 ---------------------------- 52 
32 California Jurisprudence 2d 287 ----------------------------- 51 
Dangel and Shriber, The Law of Labor Unions (1941) § 180, p. 205 
and 206 -------------------------------------------------- 33 
Dangel and Shri'ber, The Law of Labor Unions (1941) § 186, p. 211-
215 ------------------------------------------------------ 44 
Oakes, The Law of Organized Labor and Industrial Conflicts (1927) 
§ 54, p. 60 ----------------------------------------------- 33 
STATUTES 
21-51-8, U.C.A. 1953 ------------------------------------------ 70 
Rule 54 (d) (1), U.R.C.P. -------------------------------------- 70 
CASES CITED 
Allen v. Los _Angeles County District Couneil of Carpenters, 337 P. 
2d 457, 461 (1959) ---------------------------------------~~ 41 
Brown v. Stroeter, 263 SW 2d 458, 462 (Kan. City, Mo., Ct. of App. 
1953) ---------------------------------------------------- 37 
iv 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 37 Cal 2d 134, 231 ,p, 2d 6 
(1951) --------------------------------------------------- 33 
Checketts v. Collings, Utah, 1 P. 2d 950 (1931) ____ -------------- 70 
Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal 2d 480, 196 P. 2d 915 (1948) -------------- 54 
Colorado Development Co. v. Creer, 96 Utah 1, 80 P. 2d 914 (1938) 68 
Davis v. IATSE, 141 P. 2d 486, 488 (Cal. App. 1943) ------------ 35 
Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 457-460 (1912) -------------- 39 
F.x Parte Edelstein, 30 F2d 636, ('C.A. 2d 1929) cert denied 279 
u.s. 851 ------------------------------------------------- 56 
Falk v. United States, ,15 App. D.C. 446, error dismissed, 180 U.S. 
636 (1899) [23 ALR 2d 484] ------------------------------- 38 
Falkenberg v. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 269 Pac. 1008 (1928) ---------- 62 
Fordson Coal Co. v. Kentucky River Coal Corp., 69 F. 2d 131 ( C.A. 
6th 1934) ------------------------------------------------ 54 
Graham v. Street, et al, Utah 270 P. 2d 456, 459 (1954) ---------- 61 
I.A.M. v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 2 L. ed. 1018 (1958) ------------ 53 
Lawlor v. Loewe, 187 Fed 522 (C.A. 2d 1911) cert. denied 223 U.S. 
729 (1912) ----------------------------------------------- 56 
Marchitto v. Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, 88 A2d 851 
(1952) --------------------------------------------------- 56 
Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E. 2d 683, 685 (1951)_____ _ 57 
Miller v. G~ier S. Johnson, Inc., 62 SE 2d 870, 873, (1Sup. Ct. of 
App. Va. 1951) ------------------------------------------- 37 
Miller v. I.U. of Opr. Engineers, 257 P. 2d 85, 87 (Cal. App. 1953) 35 
N.L.R.B. v. Huber & Huber Motor Exp. 223 F2d 748, 749 (C.A. 
5th 1955) ----------------------------------------------·-- 47 
Ostertag v. LaMont, Utah, 339 P2d 1022, 1024, (1959) ------------ 62 
Pratt v. Amalg. Assn. of Street & Electric Rwy. Emp. of Am., Utah, 
167, Pac. 830 (1917) ------------------------------------- 34, 53 
Schneider v. Local 60, 116 La. 270, 5 L.R.A. (NJS.) 891 (1905)___ 57 
Schofield v. ZCMI, Utah, 39 ·P. 2d 342, 345 (1934) -------------- 47 
Smith v. Kern County Medical Assn., 120 P. 2d 874, 877 (Cal. Sup. 
Ct. 1942) ------------------------------------------------ 35 
State v. Aikers, Utah, 51 P. 2d 1052, 1056 (1935)----------------- 38 
Steiner v. Rowley, 35 Cal. 2d 713, 221 P. 2d 9 (1950) ------------- 54 
Sun 'Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 
etc., 95 F. Supp 50 (D.C. Pa. 1951) ------------------------- 55 
v 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Sweetman v. Barrows, 161 N.E. 272 (Mass. Sup. Ct~ 1928) 57 
Thorpe v. Thorpe, 171 P. 2d 126, 129 (Cal. 1946) _ ----------------- 37 
Van Lorn v. Schneiderman, 210 P. 2d 461, 469, 11 A.L.R. 2d 1195, 
1206 (Sup. Ct. Ore. 1949) ---------------------------------- 55 
Wein v. Crockett, Utah, 195 P. 2d 222 (1948) -·------------------ 66 
Werner v. Int. Assn. of Machinists, 11 Ill. App. 2d 258, 137 NE 2d 
100 (1956) ---------------~------------------------------- 35 
White v. Metropolitan Merchandise Mart 107 A. 2d 892 (De. 1954) 54 
Young v. Main, 72 F2d 640 (C.A. 8th 1934) --------------------- 54 
vi 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN 
OF 
THE 
THE 
SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
TROY 0. NANCE and 
THOMAS B. HANLEY, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
and Cross-Appellants, 
SHEET METAL WORKERS 
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 
an unincorporated association, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9111 
Brief for Defendant and Appellant 
THE FORM OF THE RECORD 
The case on appeal is based on an exceedingly vol-
uminous record encompassing two trials, one to the court 
below sitting without a jury and the other before a com-
mon-law jury. During the two trials, 191 exhibits were 
introduced, most of which were admitted into evidence by 
the court. 
In order to refer with facility to the massive accumu-
lation of transcripts and documents in the record, many of 
which have independent, and thus parallel, pagination, the 
following code will be observed: 
1. References to the record of all of the pleadings and 
other papers on file will be thus: (R. 1-729) etc. 
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2. References to testimony in the trial to the court 
sitting without a jury will be thus: (N.J.T. 1-6170) 
etc. 
3. References to testimony in the jury trial will be 
thus: (J.T. 1-2952) etc. 
4. References to pre-trial proceedings will be thus: 
(Pre-T., 2-2-59, 1-55) etc.1 
5. References to post-trial proceedings will be thus: 
(Post-T., 4-6-59, 1-35) etc. 
The parties to the litigation should also be explicitly 
designated at the outset of the brief, because the Appellant 
in this court was the Respondent in the court below, 
whereas the Petitioner in the trial court is now designated 
as one of the Respondents in connection with the appeal. 
Hereafter the parties will be referred to as follows: 
1. Troy 0. Nance will be referred to as "Plaintiff-
Respondent Nance,'' or sometimes merely as 
''Nance.'' 
2. Thomas B. Hanley will be referred to as ''Plain-
tiff-Respondent Hanley,'' or sometimes merely as 
''Hanley.'' 
3. Troy 0. Nance and Thomas B. Hanley may some-
times be referred to collectively as "Plaintiffs-Re-
spondents.'' 
4. Sheet Metal Workers International Association 
will be referred to as "Defendant-Appellant Uni-
on,'' or sometimes merely as ''Union.'' 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by two expelled ex-members of a 
labor union for reinstatement to membership and dam-
lPage references are to the typewritten page numbers rather than 
the numbering machine. 
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ages. Each of the expelled ex-members (Plaintiff-Re-
spondent Nance and Plaintiff-Respondent Hanley) had a 
separate and independent cause of action, but the two suits 
wpre consolidated by consent of the trial court which per-
mitted :Hanley to intervene in Nance's Petition for Writ 
of :Mandate (Civil No. 3783). Hanley's Complaint in In-
tervention (R. 131-141) was not in the .form of a petition 
for writ of mandate, however, and this distinction has sig-
nificance in connection with the issue of the allowance of 
attorneys fees, as will later be pointed out. 
The two Plaintiffs-Respondents claimed, in their re-
spective suits, that they were wrongfully and maliciously 
expelled from Defendant-Appellant Union, an unincorpor-
ated labor union (with headquarters or General Offices in 
\Vashington, D. C.) which, along with its affiliated lo-
cal unions, has represented employees in the sheet metal 
trade for more than 7'5 years. They each sought approxi-
mately the same kind of relief, namely: a declaratory 
judgment that the expulsions were illegal, reinstatement to 
union membership, actual and exemplary damages, allow-
ance of attorneys fees, and costs. Compare: amendment to 
Petition for Writ of Mandate, May 21, 1958 (R. 208-210) 
with Complaint in Intervention (R. 140). 
The court below found for the Plaintiffs-Respondents 
on the first two items. It issued a declaratory judgment that 
their expulsions were illegal and void for lack of a valid 
hearing on the charges preferred against them, and an or-
der directing their reinstatement to membership, subject 
to the right of Defendant-Appellant Union to conduct an-
other hearing or trial on the charges preferred against 
them, in which they would be accorded their alleged due; 
process rights. (R. 656-657). 
Defendant-Appellant Union has appealed from this 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
portion of the judgment, )Vh~ch was based on a ten week 
trial to the court below :~re_~ without a jury. The non-
jury trial (or phase of the case) commenced October 6, 
1958, and lasted until December 19, 1958. See Memoran-
dum of Decision of December 30, 1958 (R. 347-353) and 
Supplemental Memorandum of Decision of January 9, 1959 
(R. 354). 
At the conclusion of the first (or non-jury) phase of 
the case, the trial court expressly refused to announce its 
decision as to the issues of malice and bad faith on the part 
of the officers of Defendant-Appellant Union in connection 
with the expulsion of Plaintiffs-Respondents, for the 
avowed reason that an announcement of such decision 
would undoubtedly influence the assessment of damages 
for the wrongful expulsions to be made by the jury subse-
quently to be empaneled. (R. 353). Accordingly, the court, 
over the vigorous protest of Defendant-Appellant Union 
(Pre-T. 1-13-59, 36-43); proposed to withhold, until after 
the jury trial was over, disclosure of its decision whether 
the expulsion proceedings were malicious and brought in 
bad faith, as well as invalid. 
Shortly thereafter, on January 21, 1959, the trial court 
further announced that he, and not the jury, would decide 
the question whether exemplary damages should lie against 
Defendant-Appellant Union on account of alleged malice 
or bad faith on the part of its officers in procuring the ex-
pulsions of Plaintiffs-Respondents. All other damage 
issues in the case (including other exemplary damage 
claims) were to be thrown to the jury. (R. 367-369). 
The action above was taken by the court despite the 
fact that: 
(1) theretofore, the Plaintiffs-Respondents filed a 
formal demand for trial of damage issues by a 
jury (R. 288) ; 
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(3) 
theretofore, on January 13, 1959, in the course of 
a pre-trial hearing, the court asserted that he 
would not (and could not unless the jury empan-
eled were merely advisory in nature) decide the 
question of exemplary damages for such alleged 
malice or bad faith unless counsel stipulated that 
such question should be decided by the court. 
''Otherwise it would be a jury question to de-
cide." (Pre.-T. 1-13-59, 11-12) ; and 
theretofore, on January 18, 1959, Defendant-Ap-
pellant Union formally declined to stipulate th~t 
such question should be decided by the court and, 
to the contrary, announced that pursuant to 
Rule 39 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
it ''hereby consents to the trial of the aforesaid 
case by jury, whose verdict shall have the same 
effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of 
right upon all issues not heretofore decided by 
the court.'' ( R. 360). See also ( R. 371-372). 
Interestingly, the trial court did not attempt to reserve for 
itself the determination of any compensatory damages (R. 
367-369). 
A jury was subsequently empaneled and a jury trial 
was had of all of the damage issues involved in, or flow-
ing from, the expulsions of Plaintiffs-Respondents, except, 
of course, those withheld from the jury by the court. The 
jury trial phase lasted five weeks, from February 9, 1959, 
until March 13, 1959. 
The jury returned a general verdict for Defendant-
Appellant Union and, in answer to twelve special interroga-
tories prepared by the trial court, it specially found that 
(R. 550-551): 
1. Neither Nance nor Hanley suffered a loss of in-
come from and after July 1, 1954 (the approximate 
date of the expulsions) as a proximate result of being 
expelled from the Union, 
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2. Neither Nance nor Hanley (at any time) suffered 
humiliation or mental suffering as a proximate result 
thereof, and 
3. None of the officers or authorized agents of De-
fendant-Appellant Union (at any time) wilfully and 
wrongfully (a) prevented Nance or Hanley from get-
ting work as a sheet metal worker or (b) induced em-
ployers to fire or refuse to hire either of them. 
[Note: this finding if it had been resolved otherwise 
was to serve as the predicate for an allowance of ex-
emplary damages.] 
Plaintiffs-Respondents Nance and Hanley filed mo-
tions for a new trial (R. 558-559 and 567-568) and for entry 
of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (R. '556-557), 
both of which were denied by the trial court. (R. 615-622). 
The two Plaintiffs-Respondents have cross-appealed from 
the denial of those two motions and from the portion of 
the final judgment denying them damages on those alleg-
ed grounds or theories. 
On the same day that the motions for a new trial and 
for a judgment n.o.v. were denied, to wit: May 2, 1959, the 
trial court issued a ''Second Supplemental Memorandum of 
Decision" (R. 600-614). In this document (which was 
filed some six weeks after the jury Yerdict was returned) 
the trial court held, notlnYithstanding the findings of the 
jury that neither Nance nor Hanley had up to the time of 
the trial suffered any actual damage as a result of their 
respective expulsions, that they were nevertheless each en-
titled to judgment against Defendant-Appellant Union for 
nominal damages of $1.00. He concluded further that the 
actions of Defendant-Appellant Union in expelling Nance 
and Hanley were unreasonable, arbitrary, and malicious, 
as well as illegal, whereupon he awarded Nance and Han-
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lt>y exemplary damages of $20,000.00 apiece. Finally he 
allowed each of them to recover an additional $7,000.00 
against Defendant-Appellant Union as an allowance of rea-
sonable attorneys' fees for the 10-week (non-jury) phase 
of the case in which the issue of the legality of the expul-
sions was litigated. 
Defendant-Appellant Union has appealed from the last 
described portions of the final judgment and the findings 
and conclusions upon which they are based. 
It might be said that Defendant-Appellant Union is ap-
pealing from all of the issues (or matters) decided by the 
trial court, and that the Plaintiffs-Respondents are cross-
appealing from all issues (or matters) submitted to and 
determined by the jury. 
INTRODUCTION 
\Ve believe that much, and probably most, of the testi-
mony and documentary evidence in this long and tedious 
case is surplusage. 
While the case involves some complicated issues, the 
basic issue that can undercut all of the others is simply 
whether the Plaintiffs-Respondents, Nance and Hanley, 
were afforded, and declined or refused to avail themselves 
of, an opportunity to stand trial before a union trial board 
on charges of misconduct. We believe this must be an-
swered in the affirmative; and such a holding would largely 
dispose of the case. 
The union trials that ultimately took place (if they 
can be called trials) were held in the absence of the Plain-
tiffs-Respondents (in absentia). This is not the normal, 
the preferable, or the recommended kind of union trial, and 
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\ 
we make no contention that trials in absentia can be equat-
ed with trials in the generally accepted sense of the term. 
It is perfectly clear-and the constitution of Defend-
ant-Appellant Union in Article Eighteen, Section 2{h) 
(Exh. 53, p. 75, 76) bears this out fully-that Defendant-
Appellant Union does not favor trials in absentia. It only 
condones them as a last resort in the event that the accused 
should "refuse, fail or neglect to appear for the trial." 
Then the trial is to proceed despite a refusal, failure, orne-
glect. by the accused to appear and evidence is to be taken 
in absentia, somewhat analogous to the practice in courts of 
calling witnesses and taking evidence in the course of issu-
ing a default judgment, rather than merely issuing judg-
ment upon the bare allegations of the complaint. 
As will be seen, Plaintiff-Respondent Hanley, on his 
own behalf and on behalf of the others (such as Plaintiff-
Respondent Nance) whom he represented, refused to stand 
trial before the union trial board by both his words and, 
even more revealing, his atrocious conduct. For one thing, 
he flatly refused to abide by the rules for procedure pro-
mulgated by the chairman of the Defendant-Appellant 
Union's trial board. This alone was enough to frustrate 
the intended trials, because the union trial board had no 
bailiff, no authority to cite or punish for contempt, .and no 
way of compelling compliance with its orders. 
In truth, the trials in absentia were forced upon the 
Union by Nance and Hanley, rather than '?ice versa. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In a 15 week trial, where the transcript of testimony 
and proceedings before the court runs to over 9,000 
pages, it is virtually beyond human power to summarize 
the facts adduced within the confines of a score of pages. 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
< Hn-ionsly, therefore, a number of facts are going to be ig-
non·tl in our statement. We have, however, to the extent 
that it is feasible, tried to set out the facts which are most 
relevant, a great many of which are not controversial. By 
"not controversial" we mean that the facts are either con-
ceded by the opposing party, or are corroborated independ-
ently through a letter, transcript, affidavit, or some other 
kind of documentary evidence, and thus should not be in 
dispute on appeal. 
Plaintiff-Respondent Hanley was at one time an In-
ternational Representative of Defendant-Appellant Union. 2 
He was removed from that position on March 27, 1954, by 
Robert Byron, General President of Defendant-Appellant 
Pnion. (N.J.T. 122-123, 2944-2945). His dismissal as an In-
ternational Representative did not, however, affect his 
status as a member in good standing of Defendant-Appel-
lant Union. Hanley and Plaintiff-Respondent Nance were 
members in good standing of Defendant-Appellant Union 
until their expulsions from membership on June 29, 19'54. 
THE GROUNDS OR MOTIVES FOR PREFERRING 
CHARGES AGAINST HANLEY AND NANCE 
The trial court in the Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law herein found that" at the time Byron filed the 
charges [against Hanley and Nance accusing them of seri-
ous misconduct] he had received reports and information 
which, if assumed to be true, would have given him prob-
able cause to believe that the charges which he preferred, 
2An International Representative acts on behalf of, and carries out 
the instructions of, the General President in the territory to which he 
is assigned. He is appointed to this position, and it is strictly an em-
ployment at will which may be terminated by the General President for 
any reason, "at his pleasure." (N.J.T. 867-880). 
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or at least some of them, were true." (R. 648). There can 
be no doubt that the finding above is correct. 
As early as December of 1953, President Byron got a 
verbal complaint about Plaintiff-Respondent Hanley from· 
one Henry Ely, Secretary of an employers association 
known as Sheet Metal Contractors Association of Southern 
California. (N.J.T. 369). At this time, however, Byron had 
great confidence in his International Representative (Han-
ley) and he told Ely to stop meddling in union affairs, and 
to take up complaints of that nature with Hanley directly. 
(Exh. 77). 
Ely refused to be deterred. In February of 1954, he 
sent Byron a letter complaining about Hanley, and with it 
he enclosed two affidavits. These affidavits accused Han-
ley and John Fuller and Carl Nichols of using Sheet Metal 
Workers Unions in the Los Angeles and Las Vegas areas 
as fronts for extortion and shake-down purposes. Ely fol-
lowed up with a second letter enclosing a third affidavit. 
( Exh. 44 and 45). A meeting with Ely and one of the affi-
ants, Ira Fulmor, was promptly arranged thereafter, and it 
was held in Chicago, Illinois, on February 25 and 26, 1954. 
(N.J.T.1293-1296, 1316). 
General President Byron, General Yice Presidents 
Cronin, Bruns, and l\Iacioce, General Secretary-Treasurer 
Carlough, and General Counsel :Jiulholland met with Ful-
mor and Ely. Fulmor and Ely talked about a deteriorat-
ing labor situation in Los Angeles and Las Vegas gener-
ally, and went into detail about shake-downs and strikes 
called for extortionate purposes. (N.J.T. 1313-1325). They 
said that Hanley and Carl Nichols were large!~· responsible 
for the state of affairs, although Nance's name was also 
mentioned. (N.J.T. 1356). 
10 
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They asked President Byron to investigate the matters 
they related, i.e.: the condition in the area under I-Ianley's 
··stewardship," and President Byron assured them that he 
would do so. (N.J.T. 2882-2885, 3360-3370, 4805-4809). After 
Ely and Fulmor left the meeting, the officials of Defendant-
~\ppellant Union decided, at General Counsel Mulholland's 
suggestion, to try to employ Grant Stetter of Washington, 
D. C., a former special agent supervisor for the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and an attorney, for this purpose. 
(N.J.T. 2918-2919, 3370-3371, 4864). 
Stetter was hired on March 4, 1954. (N.J.T. 3038-3043, 
3307-3310, 48·70-4871). He immediately went to Los An-
geles where he associated with him two experienced inves-
tigators, O'Malley and Murphey (N.J.T. 4872-4874). 
O'Malley and Murphey would report to Stetter, _who, in 
turn, would report to President Byron or General Counsel 
J[ nlholland. 
Stetter made personal reports to President Byron be-
tween ,jfarch 16th and April 28th as to the results of the 
investigation. (N.J.T. 4875, 4880, 4891-4894,4899, 4902-4906, 
4912-4913). Except for one instance of an alleged shake 
down attempt at the Statler Hotel, of which charge Hanley 
was exhonerated (N.J.T. 4901-4902), he reported evidence 
of gross misconduct on the part of Hanley, Carl Nichols, 
John Fuller, and, to a lesser extent, Troy Nance and Eu-
gene Say, including such matters as intimidation of local 
union members, rigged local union elections, extortions, and 
even physical coercion and intimidation of contractors. 
Stetter completed his invesigation and prepared a sum-
mary of the results about May 9, 1954. (N.J.T. 4926). 
11 
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THEPREPARATION OF THE CHARGES 
President Byron determined at least as early as the 
middle of April, 1954, that he would have to prefer charges 
against Plaintiff-Respondent Hanley, Carl Nichols, and 
their confederates. He called a special meeting of the Gen-
eral Executive Council between the 15th and 18th of April 
at which he explained that charges would be preferred; and 
he asked which of the members of the Council would be 
able and willing to sit as a trial board. (N.J. T. 3856-3857, 
3467, 5147-5148). The trial board was not selected at this 
time, however. (N.J.T. 3857). 
Following the special meeting of the General Execu-
tive Council, President Byron accompanied by General 
Counsel Mulholland went to Los Angeles, California. 
(N.J.T. 2945-2946). Byron had some personal conferences 
with sheet metal contractors and with union members con-
cerning the activities of Hanley, Nichols, and the others ac-
cused of misconduct. 
Charges were subsequently preferred against Plain-
tiffs-Respondents Nance and Hanley, and also against Carl 
Nichols, John Fuller, and Eugene Say. Nance received his 
charges on May 18, 19.54. (Exh. 47). 
Hanley claimed that he never did receiYe a set of 
charges through the mail, even though one set of charges 
was sent to him at his home address and a second set was 
mailed to the post office box of his local union, Local 88 of 
Las Vegas, Nevada (Exh. 36 and 37; ~.J.T. 1663-1665~ 
1111-1113, 1664, 1668-1673). Even so, the court below 
found that Hanley learned that he had been charged with 
misconduct on May 18, 1954, and saw a copy of his charges 
at least by ~fay 25, 1954, a full ten days prior to the com-
mencement of his trial (R. 643, paragraph 9). 
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THE ATT~~IPTS TO HOLD TRIALS 
Hanley was notified to appear for trial at the Statler 
Hotel in Los Angeles on Thursday, June 3, 1954, at 10:00 
a.m. Nance was instructed to appear on the following day, 
June 4, 1954, for his trial. Hanley appeared at the ap-
pointed place and time, accompanied by Nance, Carl Nich-
ols, John Fuller, and Clem Vaughn. In addition, in Han-
ley's own words, there were from 50 to 75 rank and file 
members of Local Union 108 (Carl Nichols' union and one 
of the local unions served by Hanley when he was an In-
ternational Representative) who, at one time and another, 
crowded into the trial room as spectators. (Exh. 11, p. 51; 
N.J.T. 2345-2348, 2462-2468, 3726-3727, 3795-3797, 3869-
3870). 
Chaos and confusion of indescribable proportions re-
sulted from the first day, June 3rd, through the second 
day, June 4th, until on the third day, June 7th, the Chair-
man of the trial board, General Vice President Rosen, de-
clared that the accused members had refused to stand trial 
and the trials were recessed to be continued in absentia. 
It is not possible to appreciate the extent of the con-
fusion in the trial room without reading the transcripts 
of those hearings. For that reason, we are printing the 
verbatim transcripts of the hearings (Exh. 4, 5, and 6) and 
tendering them to the court with this brief, as an appendix 
thereto. 
Hanley, who was acting on behalf of all of the accused, 
completely dominated the hearing. He constantly inter-
rupted Chairman Rosen and the other two members of the 
trial board, Fitzgerald and Schroeder. His interruption~ 
were so serious-and so lengthy-that the trial board on oc-
casion actually had to leave the trial room for respite. See: 
Exh. 4, p. 111-112; Exh. 5, p. 137-157. He constantly har-
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angued with the trial board, and he would shift to a de-
mand for a new concession whenever the trial board at-
tempted to yield a point to him. 
Throughout the course of those three days Hanley 
frankly stated that he was not going to submit himself to 
trial under the terms and conditions that the trial board af-
forded. Thus, he first said he wasn't certain whether ho 
would agree to stand trial. (Exh. 4, p. 6). A few minutes 
later he said he would not stand trial until he had been 
furnished with a copy of his charges [with which he was by 
then well acquainted] and the procedure for trial. (Exh. 
4, p. 29). He next said that he would not stand trial un-
less Ernest Murphy [Byron's selected representative] left 
the trial room and Byron himself prosecuted the charges. 
(Exh. 4, p. 96). When Chairman Rosen asked him whether 
he would proceed if President Byron came into the trial 
room, he then said that Byron would have to be in the room 
and prosecute the charges and, furthermore, the trials 
would have to be held in Las Vegas rather than Los An-
geles. (Exh. 4, p. 100). Still later, Hanley said he would not 
stand trial unless it were held in Las Vegas with President 
Byron prosecuting and unless he received an extension of 
time to prepare his case. (Exh. 4, p. 102). Still later, he 
said he would not stand trial until the charges were made 
more specific by President ByTon. (Exh. 4, p. 109). Chair-
man Rosen at that point adjourned the proceedings (Exh. 
4, p. 111). 
Then, when the hearings resumed the following morn-
ing, on June 4th, Hanley took the position that the adjourn-
ment the previous day ended his trial. (Exh. 5, p. 115-117). 
Chairman Rosen specifically asked Hanley whether he 
wanted to resume his trial and he answered: 
"I desire to continue my trial if the General Pres-
ident would comply with the Constitution and filing 
14 
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the chargef-i properly. I feel that yesterday when the 
Trial Board walked out on my trial, and abruptly ad-
journed the trial, they ended the charges. I feel that 
the next move is up to the General office.'' (Exh. 5, 
p. 117, 132). 
He said he was there merely as counsel for Fuller, Nichols, 
or Nance whichever one was to be tried next. (Exh. 5, p. 
115-116). 
Hanley never changed his attitude, and on June 7, 
1954, the last day of the hearing, when he was assigned a 
new trial date by Chairman Rosen, i.e.: June 9th, he once 
again told Rosen that his trial was adjourned. (Ex. 6, p. 
4-7). 
If this were not a sufficient declaration of his inten-
tion, he made it even plainer the next night. On the eve-
ning of June 8th, 1954, Hanley delivered a speech to the 
membership of Local Union 108. He referred to the oppor-
tunity he was offered on June 3, 4, and 7 at the Statler Ho-
tel to stand trial before the Trial Board and remarked: 
'' ... Rather than go down and be tried by Moe Rosen 
out of New York City and Rene Schroeder out of 
Houston, Texas, and Joe Fitzgerald who I helped de-
feat as a candidate of the Tri-State Council of the 
Sheet :Metal vVorkers, I helped defeat him, I would 
rather be tried by William Randolph Hearst. I will 
subn1it my case, and I will defend Nichols and Fuller 
before anybody, any impartial Board. I will submit it 
to this union. There is nothing secretive, they say, but 
what did they want us to do today~ They tried to tie. 
me up in knots for four days and I have made a jack-
ass out of them, every time, and the record will show 
it." (Exh. 11, p. 51). 
Rosen stated again and again throughout the three 
day period (June 3, 4 and 7) that the hearing would not be 
in order until the trial :room was cleared of spectators and 
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witnesses. (Ex. 4 p. 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 30, 32, 
33-34, 41, 44, 54-55, 60, 61, 62, 64, 66, 84, 90; Exh. 5 p. 115, 
117-118, 128, 131 ; Exh. 6, p. 4, 17-19). This simple request 
never was complied with except for a very short period of 
time before the noon recess on June 3rd. (Exh. 4, p. 66). 
The clearing of the room was in accordance with Hanley's 
direction to the spectators, (Exh. 4, p. 64), but, then, after 
the noon recess was over, the spectators came back and 
Hanley never again told them to leave. This was despite 
Rosen's warning that the trials would not even be called 
to order unless they would leave. He plainly stated that no 
evidence would be received, no objections to procedure en-
tertained, and no rulings given unless and until this was 
done. (Exh. 4, p. 6, 22, 24, 26, 36, 41-42, 49). Hanley was 
unwilling to let go of his gallery of sympathizers, however, 
and as he, himself, put it in his affidavit of August 5, 1954, 
filed in the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia: 
"We [Hanley, Nance, Nichols and Fuller] vigor-
ously insisted upon the right of the members 
of the Local to hear the trial. Rosen then an-
nounced that he would interpret our insistence upon a 
trial that was public - so far as the membership of the 
Local was concerned - as being a refusal to stand 
trial.'' ( Exh. 131, p. 7). (Emphasis ours.) 
Still another example of Hanley's obstructionist tac-
tics is where he demanded a ruling from Chairman Rosen 
as to how under the constitution he could be tried in Los 
Angeles. (Exh. 4, p. 103). Rosen thereupon gave Hanley 
the ruling in some detail. (Exh. 4, p. 104). Hanley then 
complained that the ruling was not given in writing. (Exh. 
4, p. 105). 
To add more to the disorder, Carl Nichols, whom Han-
ley designated as his counsel, along with Vaughn, brought 
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a tape recording machine into the trial room the afternoon 
of June 3rd, and again on June 4th and June 7th. Rosen 
insisted that it be taken out but it never was; and Hanley 
never once attempted to assist in having it removed. (Exh. 
4, p. 91, 93; Exh. 5, p. 136; Exh. 6, p. 19; N.J.T. 2341, 1228-
1229 1691-1697). When Chairman Rosen insisted that it 
' " be taken out on the first day, June 3rd, Nichols contem-
putously said to him: "Speak up at it. It won't bite a bit." 
(Exh. 4, p. 93). Rosen on several occasions covered the 
microphone to the recorder with a water glass, but, when-
ever he would do this, Nichols would take the glass off. 
Chairman Rosen ordered some newspaper reporters 
who were present on the first day, June 3rd, to leave. Han-
ley encouraged them to stay on in disregard of Rosen's 
order. To one of the reporters, he said, immediately after 
Rosen told him to leave:" Stick around, Mr. Craig, I'd like 
to have my story published in the paper." (Exh. 4, p. 28 
and also p. 6 and 35-36). 
Plaintiff-Respondent Nance was as defiant and unco-
operative as Hanley, Nichols, and Fuller, albeit somewhat 
less vociferous. He was present through the proceedings 
on June 3, 4 and 7, 1954, and refused to leave at Rosen's re-
quest on June 3rd so that Hanley's trial could commence. 
(Exh. 4, p. 84, 90). He refused to leave upon Rosen's re-
quest on June 4th (Exh. 5, p. 122-123), and he told Rosen, 
truculently, that he and the other people were going to 
stay "to see that the democratic processes are carried out 
and this is carried on in a democratic manner and every-
thing above board.'' 
Nance also, at Hanley's signal, started reading aloud, 
over Rosen's protest, his objections to standing trial. Ros-
en and the rest of the trial board left the room before Nance 
finished, but undoubtedly these objections were going to 
serve as Nance's excuse for refusing to stand trial. (Exh. 
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5, p. 155-156). Nance also tried unsuccessfully, to bait 
Chairman Rosen on the third and last day, Monday, eTune 
7th. (Exh. 6, p. 16). 
The presence of spectators and witnesses in the trial 
rooms on June 3, 4 and 7 was both ominous and annoying 
• to the trial board. They made the trial room extremely 
crowded. (N.J.T. 2345-2348, 2462-2468, 3726-3727, 3730, 
379'5-3797, 3867-3868). Their talking and murmuring was 
audible in the room. (N.J.T. 2336, 3732-3737, 3802-3803, 
3884, 3807-3808, 3869-3870). They were obviously partisan 
to Hanley, Nance and the other accused members. (N.J.T. 
2337-2339, 2468-2473, 4709-4710). 
Captain Joseph E. Stephens of the Los Angeles Po-
lice Department appeared at these hearings, accompanied 
by several associates, on a tip-off from Jttsge John Fuller 
that there might be disruptions at the trials. (N.J.T. 2320-
2322). The police showed up at the first trial session, and 
after observing the demeanor of the people in the room, 
voluntarily returned for all of the remaining sessions, even 
though no one connected with the Defendant-Appellant 
Union ever requested police protection or policemen at 
the trial sessions. (N.J.T. 2334, 2344, 2351-2352). Al-
though this answer was subsequently improperly stricken 
by the trial court, Captain Stephens said he returned to the 
trials on the second day (June 4) because he felt that there 
would have been a breach of the peace if he wasn't there. 
(N.J.T. 2344-2345). 
THE TRIALS ARE RECESSED TO BE 
HELD IN ABSENTIA 
On the third day of the hearings, June 7th, after the 
spectators and witnesses still refused to leave the room, 
and after Hanley and Nichols still would not take out their 
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tape recorder, Chairman Rosen announced that the trials 
would be recessed to be continued later in absentia. (Exh. 
6, p. 19). It is self-evident, as the transcripts of the hear-
ings on June 3, 4 and 7 show, ( Exh. 4, 5, and 6), that Rosen 
and the trial board never had effective control of the hear-
ings, and they were never going to have it. Rosen warned 
Hanley and the others that this would happen if his rul-
ings were flouted, but it made no difference to them. (Exh. 
-l, p. 49, 33, 56; Exh. 5, p. 131-132). 
THE TRIAL BOARD'S LAST CHANCE OFFER 
TO STAND TRIAL ON TUESDAY, JUNE 8, 1954 
The next morning, Tuesday, June 8th, 1954, Hanley, 
Nance, and a large group of sheet metal workers again as-
sembled at the Los Angeles Statler Hotel. Chairman Ros-
en appeared in the lobby and approached Hanley, Nance, 
Fuller, and Nichols who were standing by the escalator 
platform in the lobby. Other sheet metal workers were 
gathered around and could hear all or part of what was 
said. 
Nichols, who had been absent at the close of the June 
7th session, was specifically asked if he would stand trial 
in an orderly manner. When Nichols demanded to know 
the number of the trial room, Rosen told him that the num-
ber would not be divulged but that if he and his counsel 
followed the trial board to the room he would be allowed to 
call witnesses when they were needed. (N.J.T. 3909-3911). 
In substance the same offer was made to Hanley and Nance. 
(~.J.T. 3914, 3678-3682, 3648-3650, 2491-2492). This offer 
was declined. (N.J. T. 2941). 
This "last chance" offer of an opportunity to stand 
trial is undisputable. Hanley alluded to it in the Electri-
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cians Hall speech. (Ex. 11, p. 51-52). He also referred to it 
in his appeal to the General Executive Council from the 
decision of the trial board (Exh. 6, p. 4-5), and in the affi-
davit he filed on August ·5, 1954, in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia where he was seek-
ing to have that court enjoin Defendant-Appellant Union 
from holding its quadrennial convention in 1\fontreal, Can-
ada, in August of 1954. He there swore: 
''He [Rosen] adjourned the trial board meeting. 
We did not participate in the trial after this because 
we did not know where the trial was being held and be-
cause the board would not tell us. They did say that 
if we would follow then~ without anybody else, the?J 
would take us to the trial romn. '' (Exh. 131, p. 7) 
(Emphasis ours.) 
THE CONSPIRACY OF HANLEY, NANCE, 
NICHOLS AND FULLER TO SABOTAGE THE TRIALS 
We want to call the court's attention briefly to the 
testimony of witness John Fuller, who evidently was not 
credited by the trial court. Fuller was one of the four 
members to be tried at the Statler Hotel and a close asso-
ciate of Hanley. It was Fuller who called Lieutenant (now 
Captain) Stephens of the Los Angeles Police Department 
on May 30, 1954, and told him there was going to be trou-
ble at the trials at the Statler Hotel on June 3rd, and some-
one is liable to get hurt. (N.J.T. 2267-2268) [Proffer of 
Fuller]. Stephens corroborated this. (N.J.T. 2312, 2320-
2322). 
Fuller's testimony from N.tT.T. 2217 to 2280 is a de-
tailed account of the conspiracy to which hr was a party, 
along with Hanley, Nance and Nichols, to thwart the trial 
board and sabotage the trials. At N.J.T. 2457-2458 he tes-
tified that Hanley instructed him and Nichols, just prior 
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to the time the trials were to start, to make out as if they 
were going to stand trial but never agree to. They were to 
talk loud and encourage the men that would be in the room 
to join in the -conversation, and do everything except stand 
trial. If it got down to technical things, he (Hanley) would 
take over. 
The transcripts of the trial proceedings on June 3, 4, 
and 7 at the Statler Hotel (Exh. 4, 5, and 6) demonstrate 
perfect execution of this plan. Fuller's admission of the 
conspiracy to block the trials is actually the only ra tiona] 
explanation for Hanley's and Nance's aberrant conduct 
in the trial room. 
THE TRIALS IN ABSENTIA 
The Trial Board changed trial rooms after the last 
"open hearing" on June 7th and in the afternoon of the 
same day it commenced to hear in absentia evidence in the 
trial of John Fuller. (Exh. 8, p. 1). Hanley's trial com-
menced on June 8th at 2:50p.m. (Exh. 7, p. 2) and Nance's 
trial on June lOth at 4:05 p. m. (Exh. 10, p. 2). Witnesses 
were called to give testimony and documentary matters 
were offered and received as exhibits before the trial board. 
(Exh. 7, 8, 9, 10). 
After the hearings in absentia were concluded, the 
members of the trial board conferred privately on the 
cases and reached decisions in each of them. There was 
one conference on the evening that the last case (Nance's) 
was completed (N.J.T. 3972) and a further conference for 
more than an hour the following morning. (N.J.T. 3971). 
Chairman Rosen put the decision into rough draft form 
and then asked General Counsel Mulholland "to polish 
them off." (N.J.T. 3972). 
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The decisions were against the four members and the 
trial board recommended that they be expelled from mem-
bership. (Exh. 24 [Decision on Hanley's case] and Exh. 48 
[Decision on Nance's case]). The decisions were mailed 
out June 29, 1954. 
THE APPEALS OF HANLEY AND NANCE 
General President Byron disqualified himself from 
considering any appeals from the decisions of the tria] 
board because he was the charging party, and he advised 
Hanley that he and the other members found guilty by the 
trial board could appeal directly to the General Executive 
Council. (Exh. 26). Hanley and Nance filed appeals from 
the decisions of the trial board on August 6th and 7th re-
spectively. (Exh. 27 and 49). Fuller and Nichols appealed 
also. 
They were notified that their appeals would be con-
sidered by the General Executive Council commencing on 
August 13, 1954, in Montreal, Canada. (Exh. 28). Hanley, 
Fuller and Nichols went to Montreal, Canada, to present 
their appeals. Nance did not go, but he authorized Han-
ley to act as his counsel and representative with respect to 
his appeal. (N.J.T. 1456). 
Hanley waived all rights to appear before the Gen-
eral Executive Council (Exh. 29), as also did Nichols and 
Fuller, so that their cases could be presented to the Griev-
ances and Appeals Committee of Defendant-Appellant 
Union's General Convention, and be reported out for ap-
propriate action to the General Convention itselt which 
was to meet in Montreal, commencing on August 16, 1954. 
Hearings before the Grievances and Appeals Commit-
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tee took place in :Montreal, Canada, on the Tuesday, \Ved-
ne~day, and Thursday of the week preceding the General 
Convention (August lOth, 11th and 12th). (N.J.T. 3627-
3628). The Grievance and Appeals Committee, throng~ 
its chairman, Frank Burk, and its secretary, Mell Farell, 
ruled that no new evidence or testimony would be received 
and that the committee would limit itself to consideration 
of the transcripts of the trials in Los Angeles and any mat-
ters or documents which were contained in the formal writ-
ten appeals of the parties. (N.J.T. 3555-3556, 3608-3609, 
3612-3613, 4392-4394). Hanley presented all of the ap-
peals. (N.J.T. 4389). 
The Grievances and Appeals Committee exhonorated 
Hanley on one charge on the ground that documentary evi-
dence attached to his formal appeal refuted it. It affirm-
ed the conviction on the other charges, however, and rec-
ommended to the General Convention that his expulsion be 
upheld. (Exh. 30, p. 62-63). The General Convention, by a 
rising vote, adopted the recommendation of the Griev-
ances and Appeals Committee as to Hanley's expulsion, 
with 7 dissenting votes. ( Exh. 30, p. 64). 
In the case of Troy Nance, the Grievances and Ap-
peals Committee affirmed his conviction on all counts and 
recommended that the General Convention uphold its rec-
ommendation; which it did, unanimously. (Exh. 30, p. 65-
66). 
FAILURE TO INCLUDE NE\V OR REFUTING 
EVIDENCE IN THE FORMAL APPEALS 
If Hanley, Nance, and the others had the refuting evi-
dence they claimed, their failure to incorporate it into their 
formal written appeals is totally incomprehensible. Han-
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ley, as a former International Representative, was well-
versed on the Defendant-Appellant Union's Constitution. 
(Exh. 53.) 
Under Section 2(b) of Article Nineteen of Defendant-
Appellant Union's constitution (Exh. 53, p. 78) it is pro-
vided that an appeal to the General President" shall be ac-
companied by such documentary evidence as the appealing 
party may deem necessary for the proper and complete 
consideration of his or their appeal." 
Under Section 3(a) of Article Nineteen (Exh. 53, P. 
78-79) it is stated that original appeals to the General 
Executive Council (which is what this was since President 
Byron disqualified himself from considering it) shall in-
clude ''all documentary evidence and argument which the 
appealing party or parties may deem necessary for tlie 
proper consideration of the appeal." And in Section 3 (b) 
it is said that the decision of the General Executive Coun-
cil shall be based "only upon the evidence and argument 
submitted in accordance with paragraph (a) of this see-
tion [except that oral argument may be permitted]." 
Section 4 of Article Nineteen provides for referral of 
appeals from decisions of the General Executive Council 
to the Grievances and Appeals Committee ''for considera-
tion and report and the decision of the General Convention 
shall be recognized and accepted as final. ' ' ( Exh. 53, P. 
79, 80) Nothing in the constitution would indicate that 
new evidence could be received by the Grievances and Ap-
peals Committee. 
Hanley and Nance unquestionably could have incorpor-
ated all of their alleged refuting documentary evidence 
and affidavits of testimony of alleged refuting witnesses 
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into their formal written appeals. Had this been done, 
all of such purported evidence would have been considered 
by the Grievances and Appeals Committee, and thus, by 
the General Convention. 
When asked why he did not include documentary evi-
dence to rebut the findings of the trial board, Hanley re-
sponded with the unsatisfactory answer that it was too 
voluminous. He conceded, nevertheless, that there was no 
limit upon the size of their appeal or the number of docu-
ments that could have been annexed thereto. (N.J.T. 205-
206). 
THE ALLEGED POLITICAL CONSPIRACY 
TO EXPEL NANCE AND HANLEY 
Plaintiffs-Respondents Nance and Hanley tried to es-
tablish in the court below a political motivation to explain 
their being charged with misconduct and expelled. Their 
contention was that the charges filed were false, and known 
to be false by President Byron, but filed nonetheless be-
cause this was the only way that they could be kept away 
from the convention of Defendant-Appellant Union in Mon-
treal, Canada. Their presence at the convention was sup-
posed to have been feared because they would advocate 
passage of two resolutions, to wit: 
(1) a resolution to change the method of selecting 
General Vice Presidents which would have required 
them to be selected out of specific geographical areas. 
(Exh. 12), and 
(2) a resolution to retire President Byron and create 
for him the position of president emeritus. (Exh. 13). 
The trial court did give credit to some of this political 
evidence, and he found that both President Byron and the 
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members of the trial board had knowledge of, and were op-
posed to, the Plaintiffs-Respondents' advocacy of those two 
resolutions. As nearly as we understand the ruling of the 
court below, it further found that Byron resented their po-
litical activities and that their participation therein was 
at least a partial explanation for the filing of charges 
against them (although the court also found that justifiable 
cause for filing the charges existed). In the court's opinion, 
moreover, the trial board was unduly influenced in their 
conduct of the trial proceedings and in their decision to 
hold the trials in absentia by a desire to cooperate with By-
ron in his efforts to expel Hanley and Nance. (R. 646-648, 
paragraphs 20, 21, 24, 25, 26). 
These latter findings, among others, presumably serv-
ed as the predicate for the Court's conclusion that having 
or permitting trials in absentia was unreasonable, arbi-
trary, and malicious as well as illegal, which, in turn, was 
the basis for the court's subsequent award of punitive 
damages. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAIN-
TIFFS-RESPONDENTS WERE \YR.ONGFULLY EX-
PELLED FROM :MEMBERSHIP IN DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT UNION, AND THAT THEIR EXPUL-
SIONS ARE NULL AND VOID. 
A. The Court erred as a ~latter of Law In Finding 
and Concluding that the Plaintiffs-Respondents 
Did Not Refuse to Stand Trial Before Defendant-
Appellant Union's Trial Board. 
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B. The Court Erred as a :\fatter of Law In Finding 
and Concluding that the Trials In Absentia of 
Plaintiffs-Respondents Violated their Rights Un-
der the Constitution of Defendant-Appellant 
Union and Under the Law Forbidding the Taking, 
of Property \Vithout Due Process of Law. 
C. The Court Erred as a :Matter of Law In Finding 
and Concluding that Plaintiffs-Respondents' 
Remedy Upon Appeal Through the Defendant-
Appellant Union Tribunals was Inadequate and 
Did not Cure the Alleged Defects of the Trial 
Board Proceedings Below. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE AC-
TIONS OF DEFENDANT- APPELLANT UNION AND 
SOME OF ITS OFFICERS WERE MALICIOUS, ARBI-
TRARY, AND UNREASONABLE IN CONNECTION 
\YITH THE PREFERRING OF CHARGES, TRIAL 
PROCEEDINGS, AND APPEAL THROUGH THE UNI-
OX TRIBUNALS. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PUNITIVE 
(EXENIPLARY) DAMAGES SHOULD BE AWARD-
ED FOR PLANTIFFS-RESPONDENTS' WRONGFUL 
EXPULSIONS FROM UNION MEMBERSHIP. 
A. The Court Erred As a Matter of Law In Allowing 
Punitive Damages in Mandamus and Injunction 
Proceedings. 
B. The Court Erred as a Matter of Law In Allowing 
Punitive Damages in a Breach of Contract Action. 
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C. If Punitive Damages Were Allowable, the Court 
Erred as a Matter of Law in Refusing to Submit 
All Such Damage Issues to the Jury. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING AWARDS OF NOM-
INAL AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER THE CIR. 
CUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
A. It Was Error for the Court to Award Nominal 
Damages after the Jury Returned a Verdict that 
No Compensatory Damages Were Suffered by 
Either of the Plaintiffs-Respondents. 
B. It Was Error for the Trial Court to Award Puni-
tive Damages "\Vithout Having an Award of Com-
pensatory Damages Upon Which to Base It. 
C. The Award of Punitive Damages Is Wholly Dis-
proportionate to the Nominal A ward. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED AS A :MATTER OF LAW IN 
HOLDING THE MEMBERSHIP OF DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT UNION LIABLE IN PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES FOR ALLEGED ~!(ALICE OR BAD FAITH ON 
THE PART OF ITS OFFICERS IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE EXPULSIONS OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPON-
DENTS IN. THE ABSENCE OF A FI~DL\G OF RATI-
FICATiON BY TfiAT BODY OF SUC~ ALLEGED 
'VANTON OR l\[ALICIOUS CONDUCT. 
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POINT VI 
TH~J COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ISSUE 
AND THE POWER TO ENFORCE A WRIT OF :MAN-
DATE OR A MANDATORY INJUNCTION AGAINST 
A NON-RESIDENT UNINCORPORATED LABOR AS-
SOCIATION CO~IPELLING SUCH ASSOCIATION TO 
REINSTATE PLANTIFFS-RESPONDENTS. 
POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN RE-
FUSING TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS AND 
DIS~IISS ACTIONS BECAUSE DEFENDANT-APPEL-
LANT UNION IS NOT SUBJECT TO PROCESS IN 
THE STATE OF UTAH. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN AL-
LOWING EACH OF THE PLAINTIFFS-RESPOND-
ENTS TO RECOVER THEIR ATTORNEYS FEES 
AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLANT UNION. 
POINT IX 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
TAXING CERTAIN COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT UNION. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAIN-
TIFFS-RESPONDENTS WERE WRONGFULLY EX-
PELLED FROM MEMBERSHIP IN DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT UNION, AND THAT THEIR EXPUL-
SIONS ARE NULL AND VOID 
A. The Court Erred as a Matter of Law In Finding 
and Concluding that the Plaintiffs-Respondents 
Did Not Refuse to Stand Trial and that the Trials 
In Absentia Violated Their Rights Under the Con-
stitution of Defendant-Appellant Union and the 
Law Forbidding the Taking of Property Without 
Due Process of Law. 
We are combining under Sub-Section A the first two 
Sub-Sections under Point I. 
The evidence of Plaintiffs-Respondents contemptuous 
and disruptive conduct before Defendant-Appellant Union's 
trial board has already been summarized in the Statement 
of Facts. Nothing can be added here that would enhance that 
description, but we do once again urge the court to read 
the verbatim transcripts of the hearings on June 3rd, 4th, 
and 7th, printed under separate cover, in the Appendix. 
We will now show that the Plaintiffs-Respondents 
were accorded the full measure of their rights regarding a 
trial on the charges preferred against them, under both 
the constitution of Defendant-Appellant Union and the ap-
plicable principles of due process of law. 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the legal principles 
involved, however, we want to point out some fundamental 
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t>tTors or misconceptions of the court below, which perhaps 
tend to explain the ultimate error in the final judgment. 
The court below erroneously believed that a trial in 
absentia was virtually illegal per se. This attitude was 
made apparent as early as October 23, 1957, when the court 
granted Plaintiff-Respondent Nance's motion to strike the 
entire Answer of Defendant-Appellant Union to his Peti-
tion for Writ of :Mandate despite the fact that Defendant-
Appellant Union had stated as a defense, inter alia, that 
Nance, Hanley, and others frustrated the attempts of the 
trial board to conduct their trials. 
At the conclusion of the case, nearly two years later, 
the trial court held to the same view. Thus, in assigning 
reasons for amercing Defendant-Appellant Union in puni-
tive damages twenty thousand times as great as the actual 
(nominal) damages suffered by the two Plaintiffs-Re-
~pondents, the .• court said: 
"(a) That trial in absentia, where there has been no 
consent or waiver, is abhorrent to the principles of 
Justice and fair play. (R. 6'52) 
"(g) That the [Defendant-Appellant Union] in up-
holding the action of its officers and Trial Committee 
is attempting to defend trial in absentia-a hateful 
thing in any ci1.:ilizPd society." (R. 653) (Emphasis 
ours.) 
\V e, of course, are not attempting to defend trial in ab-
sentia as a general proposition. But if a union member, 
through misconduct, frustrates the holding of his trial, his 
rights of a trial cease. He can thereafter be found guilty of 
the charges and expelled, either by default or upon the 
basis of a trial in absentia at which evidence is received. 
Of the many paragraphs contained in the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the trial court below, not 
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a single one is critical of the deportment of Hanley and 
Nance or their close confederates Fuller, Nichols, and 
Vaughn. No criticism, either, was made of conduct of 
the crowd in the trial room. It would appear that so far 
as the court below was concerned, the Union's trial board 
committed grossly illegal acts by refusing to comply with 
the requests made by Hanley, Nance, and their compatri-
ots, but that the latter for their part were under no legal 
duty to comply with any of the requests made, or conditions 
imposed, by the trial board. From what one can gather 
from reading the decision of the court below, the actions 
and general conduct of Hanley and Nance are very models 
of decorum for accused members of any unincorporated 
association. This, of course, simply cannot be correct. 
The trial court never was able to comprehend that the 
question of the ultimate soundness of Hanley's and Nance's 
motions for bills of particulars and continuances, and their 
other demands made during the course of the "open hear-
ings'' was utterly immaterial as an issue in this case. They 
were guilty of misconduct nothwithstanding that their ob-
jections to any of the trial board's rulings might have been 
well-taken because they would never comply with the trial 
board's liminal rules so that such requests, demands, and 
motions could be submitted properly for consideration. 
Had they been willing to do this, some, and perhaps most, 
of those matters might have been resolved by the trial 
board in their favor. 
Their grievous mistake was in refusing to stand trial 
on conditions laid down by the trial board and refusing even 
to let the trials get started. Instead, they took the position 
that any trials that would take place would have to be 
conducted strictly on their terms. If the trial board had 
given in on this point, a state of anarchy would have re-
sulted. 
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TilE ELEJ[ENTS OF DUE PROCESS 
REQUIRED FOR UNIO~ TRIALS 
The authorities all substantially agree that the ele-
ments of fair play or due process of law applicable to trials 
of a member of an unincorporated association are (1) no-
tice of the charges of misconduct and (2) an opportunity 
for the member to be heard in his own defense. As is stated 
in OAKES, THE LAw OF ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL 
CoNFLICTS (1927) ~54 at page 60: 
'' 'The law insures to every member of a volun-
tary association a fair trial, not only in accordance 
with the constitution and by-laws of the association but 
also with the demands of fair play, which in the final 
analysis, is the spirit of the law of the land.' 
''He is therefore entitled to notice and opportun-
ity to be heard in his own defense." (Emphasis ours.) 
See also : DANGEL AND SHRIBER, THE LAw oF LABOR UNIONS 
(1941) ~ 180 at pages 205 and 206. 
A good statement of this proposition is also found in 
Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 37 Cal. 2d 134, 231 P. 
2d 6 (1951) at page 11: 
"It is a fundamental principle of justice that no 
man may be condemned or prejudiced in his rights 
without an opportunity to make his defense, and this 
r>rinciple is applicable not only to courts but also to 
labor unions and similar organizations. Taboada v. 
Sociedad Espanola De Beneficencia Mutua, 191 Cal 
187, 191, 215 P 673, 27 ALR 1508; Ellis v. American 
Federation of Labor, 48 Cal App2d 440, 443, 120 P2d 
79. It is, of course, true that the refined and technical 
practices which have developed in the courts cannot be 
imposed upon the deliberations of workingmen, and the 
form of procedure is ordinarily immaterial if the ac-
cused is accorded a fair trial. See McConville v. Milk 
Wagon Drivers' Union, 106 Cal App 696, 701 289 P 
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852; 30 Columb L. Rev 847, 852; 4 Am Jur 471-472; 7 
CJS, Associations §25, ·page 61. The union's proce-
dure, however, must be such as will afford the accused 
member substantial justice, and the requirements of a 
fair trial will be imposed even though the rules of the 
union fail to provide therefor. Taboada v. Sociedad 
Espanola De Beneficencia Mutua, 191 Cal 187, 192, 
215 P 673, 27 ALR 1508; Von Arx v. San Francisco 
Gruetli Verein, 113 Cal 377, 379, 45 P 685; Ellis v. Am-
erican Federation of Labor, 48 CaL App 2d 440, 443-
444, 120 P2d; see Dangel and Shriber, Labor Unions 
[1941] 204-206; Martin, Law of Labor Unions [1910] 
384-386. The authorities recognize that such a trial 
includes the right to notice of the charges, to confront 
and cross.,.examine the accusers, and to examine and 
refute the evidence.'' (Emphasis ours.) 
The proposition that trials before a labor union's tri-
bunal do not have to be conducted with the same formali-
ties and under the same rules as courts of law is also sup-
ported in Pratt v. Amalg. Assn. of Street and Electric Rwy 
Emp. of Am., Utah, 167 Pac 830 (1917). 
The notice issue which Hanley tried to urge before 
the trial board and later in the trial court is all but frivo-
lous. We shall not even argue this insubstantial point, but 
shall merely state that he undoubtedly had adequate no-
tice of his charges. Nance concedes that he had notice, well 
in advance of the hearings. 
As to the second element of due process, the record in 
this case establishes that Hanley and Nance were 
accorded an opportunity to have a trial on their charges 
with full rights toexamine and cross-examine all witnesses 
and to introduce testimony and exhibits. To put it more 
strongly (and accurately), the record shows that this is 
what the Defendant-Appellant Union desperately wanted 
to give them. The opportunity was qui_te convincingly re-
fused, however. 
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THE TRIAL IX ABSENTIA 
\YAS NOT ILLEGAL PER SE 
There are a number of cases which hold that a· trial of 
a member of an unincorporated association in his absence 
may be valid under certain conditions. 
In Smith v. Kern County Medical Assn, 120 P 2d 874, 
877 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1942), the member failed to show up at 
the appointed time and place for his trial. The court said: 
''There is sufficient evidence in the record to sup-
port the findings of the trial court. The procedure pro-
vided by the rules of the society was followed and the 
petitioner was accorded every opportunity to defend 
himself. He may not be allowed to complain that hear-
ings, of which he had due notice and opportunity to 
attend, were conducted in his absence. The require-
ments of the law are fulfilled when the accused is af-
forded notice and an opportunity to be heard. Levy 
v. l\1:agnolia Lodge, IOOF, supra. If the society did 
not receive evidence from the accused himself, it was 
not a failure of the law or the rules adopted by the 
society, but a failure on the part of the accused when 
he voluntarily absented himself from hearings of 
which he had due notice." 
See also: Davis v. IATSE, 141 P. 2d 486, 488 (Cal. App. 
1943) and vVerner v. Int. Assn. of Machinists, 11 Ill. App 
2d 258, 137 NE 2d 100 (1956). 
Miller v. I.U. of Opr. Engineers, 257 P. 2d 85, 87 (Cal. 
App. 1953) presents a situation more closely analogous to 
the case at bar. There, the trial of two Los Angeles mem-
bers of the union was scheduled in Chicago. The members 
demanded a trial in Los Angeles but were informed, in-
stead, that their expenses to Chicago would be paid. The 
expenses of two representatives was to have been paid also. 
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A continuance was requested and granted. Then other con-
tinuance was sought, denied, and they were tried in absenl-
tia. The court ruled : 
''The constitution did not give plaintiff the right 
to be tried in Los Angeles. It was within the discre-
tion of the board under the constitution to hold the 
trial in Chicago. The accused were notified by letter 
of October 18, 1950, that a trial would be held Novem-
ber 14th. They demanded a trial in Los Angeles and 
they were infQ-rmed by the general secretary-treasurer 
that if they attended the trial in Chicago their reason-
able expense would be approved and paid. Through 
their spokesman they replied, demanding payment of 
their expenses of travel and while in attendance upon 
the hearing, and also their wages during the time they 
would be away from work. They were then request-
ed to select two of their number to appear at the trial 
as their representatives and provision was made by 
the secretary for two airplane tickets for the represen-
tatives to be selected. This procedure was rejected by 
the members. The hearing was postponed from No-
vember 14th to November 16th for the appearance of 
some repre~entatives, but no appearance was made 
and the hearing was had on the 16th. The board found 
that the dem,ands of the alccused were unreasonable, 
that they had acted in bad faith and had no intention 
of attending the trial. Under these circumstances the 
contention that the accused 'were not given an oppor-
tunity to confront the witnesses and to be heard in 
their defense cannot be sustained." (Emphasis ours.) 
Similarly, the trial board of Defendant-Appellant Union 
properly ruled in the case at bar that Hanley, Nance, and 
the others accused had not in good faith apy:>eared for trial. 
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TRIALS MAY BE CO~DUCTED IN THE 
ABSENCE OF A PARTY IN COURTS OF LAW 
Even in actions in courts of law there are situations 
where trials and portions of trials are validly conducted 
in the absence of a party. A default judgment in civil ac-
tions is the first example that comes to mind. But there are 
other ones too. 
For instance, in Brown v. Stroeter, 263 SW 2d 458 
(Kan. Cit., Mo., Ct. of App. 1953), a suit in equity to cancel 
a lease, one of the parties changed counsel just before the 
trial. She did not appear at the trial but her new lawyer 
sought a continuance which was denied. The trial court 
felt that the change in counsel was made for purposes of 
delay, and the court of appeals affirming held at page 462: 
''Whether or not a court has abused its discretion 
in the rna tter of proceeding with the hearing of a case 
in the absence of a party or his attorney depends up-
on the particular facts and circumstances in the given 
case." 
In Thorpe v. Thorpe, 171 P 2d 126, 129 (Cal. 1946) a 
wife failed to appear in her husband's divorce action, al-
though it was a contested case. The court felt her affi-
davit of illness was not made in good faith and proceeded 
with the trial. The court said: 
"As has already been pointed out, the right of 
a litigant to be present to defend or prosecute an ac-
tion is not absolute.'' 
In Miller v. Grier 8. Johnson, Inc., 62 S.E. 2d 870, 873, 
(Sup. Ct. of App. Va. 1951) the court proceeded to trial 
despite defendant's affidavit of illness. The reviewing 
court, in affirming, said: 
"A litigant not only has a right to be present at 
the trial, but it is presumed that he will be present for 
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the purpose of aiding and assisting in the protection of 
his rights. However, a litigant forfeits this privilege 
or right when it appears that his absence is for the 
purpose of forcing a continuance which tends to hin-
der and delay the orderly and expeditious administra-
tion of justice.'' 
Even in criminal cases, the right to be present at trial 
is not absolute. In State v. Aikers, Utah, '51 P. 2d 1052, 
1056 ( 1935) this court said : 
'' [Defendant] usually will not be permitted to 
take advantage of his own misconduct when he has 
voluntarily absented himself from the trial. It is one 
thing for him to absent· himself when he is at liberty 
and may voluntarily do so, and quite another thing 
for the court to deprive him of any substantial right 
against protest .... 
* * * 
"A defendant is entitled to be safeguarded in 
every constitutional right, but should not be permit-
ted to so juggle with such rights as to embarrass and 
delay the courts or to defeat the ends of justice.'' 
And the following quotation from Falk v. United 
States, 15 App D.C. 446, error dismissed, 180 U.S. 636 
(1899) [23 ALR 2d 484] is very much in point. There, the 
prisoner escaped from jail and fled during the course of his 
trial. The Court of Appeals said: 
"It is unfortunate, perhaps, that in several of the 
cases cited the fact of escape or absconding by an ac-
cused person under indictment, and whose trial has 
been commenced, has been held to be a waiver of the 
right of the person to be present at the whole trial and 
at every stage of the trial. In our opinion, there is no 
question of waiver here of any right. The question is 
one of broad public policy, whether an accused person, 
placed upon trial for crime and protected by all the 
safeguards with which the humanity of our present 
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criminal law sedulously surrounds him, can with im-
punity defy the processes of that law, paralyze the 
proceedings of courts and juries and turn them into a 
~olemn farce, and ultimately compel society, for its 
own safety, to restrict the operation of the principle 
of personal liberty. Neither in criminal nor in civil 
cases will the law allow a person to take advantage of 
his 01cn wrong. And yet this would be precisely what 
it would do if it permitted an escape from prison, or an 
absconding from the jurisdiction while at large on 
bail, during the pendency of a trial before a jury, to 
operate as a shield from further prosecution for the 
crime. An escape is itself a criminal offense, although 
now rarely punished independently of the principal of-
fense for which the party is held. Can it be that an 
ad, which is in itself a criminal offense, is to be al-
lowed in law to oper3:te as a release from criminal 
prosecution, and therefore ultimatel:v from criminal 
liability? We can not think that the constitutional 
guarantee in its practical application will lead us to 
any conclusion so absurd. The Constitution was no~ 
intended to shield the guilt~? from the consequences of 
crime, but to protect the innocent.'' (Emphasis ours.) 
See also: Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 457-460 
(1912). 
A trial in absentia, thus, is not necessarily abhorrent or 
illegal, and, as we have shown, courts of law have in ap-
propriate circumstances proceeded with trials in the ab-
sence of a party or of the accused. The cases cited aboYe 
indicate that tpere are far worse things than trials in ab-
sentia, one of which is to thwart or subvert one's right to 
trial by one's own misconduct and then to seek to reap ad-
vantage from that fact. This is precisely what Hanley 
and N a nee did here. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
THE TRIALS IN ABSENTIA WERE JUSTIFIED 
UNDER DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
UNION'S CONSTITUTION 
The trials of Hanley and Nance were held before a 
trial board consisting of General Officers of Defendant-
Appellant Union, as is permitted in Section 3 of Article 
Eighteen (18)- of the Union constitution. (Exh. 53, page 
76-77). Section 3 (b) thereof provides: 
''The General Officer or Officers designated by 
the General President shall constitute a trial board 
and all parties shall be given the same opportunity to 
present evidence and exhibits, to cross-examine wit-
nesses, and for the accused to be represented by a good 
standing member of his local union as counsel, to 
which they would be entitled in a trial before a local 
union trial committee, as provided in Section 2 of this 
Article.'' (Emphasis ours.) 
Section 2(h) of Article Eighteen (18) (Exh. 53, page 
75-76) provides: 
"Except as provided in paragraph (i) of this 
-Section, should the accused refuse, fail or neglect to 
appear for trial after due notice, the trial committee-
shall proceed with the trial, hear such evidence as 
may be presented by witnesses who respond to notice 
and render its findings, decision and recommenda-
tions.'' 
The trials in absentia given to Hanley and Nance and 
also to Car 1 Nichols and John Fuller were all in strict con-
formity with Sections 2 and 3 of Article Eighteen (18). 
The accused members (Hanley, Nance, Nichols and Fuller} 
did not appear for trial on June 3, 4 and 7, 1954, in the sense 
that "for trial" means for purposes of going to or sub-
mitting to trial. They physically appeared in the rooms 
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appointed as the trial rooms but only to insure that their 
trials would not take place. 
Likewise, on Tuesday, June 8, 1954, they were afford-
ed still another opportunity to appear before the trial 
board and go through trials on their charges, but again 
they refused to take advantage of it. 
The opportunity to attend and participate in a trial 
which is required under the Union constitution and under 
principles of fair play or due process of law was, there-
fore, extended to each of them. Having declined to accept 
those opportunities, they have no right now to complain 
that they subsequently were found guilty of the charges 
preferred against them in trials at which they were not in 
attendance. 
NANCE AND HANLEY WERE NOT ENTIT-LED TO 
ANY RELIEF BECAUSE THEY DID NOT COl\fE 
BEFORE THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS 
Recently, the California Supreme Court in Allen v. 
Los Angeles County District Co1tncil of Oarpenters, 337 P. 
2d 457 (1959), denied reinstatement' to an expelled union 
member, despite the fact that there were irregularities in 
the proceeding before the union tribunals. In that case 
the expelled member refused to state whether he was a 
Communist. The court said at page 461: 
''The proceeding before the trial court for a writ 
of mandate was an equitable proceeding, in which the 
trial court was vested with a wide discretion. Parker 
\~. Bowron, 40 Cal. 2d 344; Bartholomae Oil Corp. v. 
Superior Court, 18 Cal 2d 726; Rogers v. Board of Di-
rectors of Pasadena, 218 Cal. 221 ; El Camino L. Corp. 
Y. Bd. of Supervisors, 43 Cal. App. 2d 351 ;- N eto v. Con-
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selho Am or. etc., 18 Cal. App 234. The doctrine of 
'clean hands' was therefore applicable. 32 Cal. J ur. 2d, 
Mandamus, §8, pp. 125-126. Thus, even assuming some 
showing of irregularity in the proceedings before the 
union committee, plaintiff may not successfully con-
tend on this appeal that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in denying the writ in the absence of a showing 
in the trial court that he came into court with 'clean 
hands,' and that he was entitled to the relief demand-
ed, which was reinstatement to membership in the 
union. See N eto v. Conselho Am or etc., supra, 18 Cal. 
App 234; Note 36 A.L.R. 508. Plaintiff made no such 
showing but, on the contrary, refused to answer the 
question relating to his eligibility to attain or retain 
such membership.'' 
We do not believe, frankly, that the clean hands rule 
is needed to dispose of this case. The ruling of the trial 
court below is patently erroneous, as a matter of law. 
The trial court's basic proposition that the trials in ab-
sentia were illegal under the Union constitution and prin-
ciples of due process of law is erroneous in the circum-
stances of this case. 
Nevertheless, it is entirely accurate to observe that, 
even if the Union trial board had committed some errors 
and had deprived Hanley and Nance of son1e rights, the 
utterly contemptuous misconduct on their part 1nore than 
nullified these errors, and they would not have been able 
to come into the trial court below with clean hands, so as to 
be entitled to the extraordinary equitable relief of rein-
statement to membership in Defendant-Appellant Union. 
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POINT I 
B. '/'h(' C'ourt Erred As a Matter of Law In Concl~td­
ing That Plaintiffs-Respondents' Remedies Upon 
Appeal Thro~tgh Defendant- Appellant Union's 
Trib nuuls were Inadrquate and Did Not Cure tll e 
Alleged Defects of the Trial Board Proceedings 
Below 
Time does not permit a lengthy discussion of the rights 
of Hanley and Nance in the appellate tribunals of De-
fendant-Appellant Union. Suffice it to say that extensive 
and effective appeal procedures are provided for an ag-
grieved member of the Union in Article Nineteen ( 19) of 
the Constitution. (Exh. 53, page 78-80). 
The appeals, which are to be filed in writing, are re-
quired to contain such documentary evidence and argument 
as the appealing parties may deem necessary for a proper 
consideration of their appeals, and decisions on appeals 
are to be based solely on the record of the case, the written 
statements of the appeals, and the documentary evidence 
and argument incorporated or annexed thereto. Article 
Nineteen (19), Sec. 3(a), 3(b). Oral argument may be per-
mitted, but it is limited to evidence in the record of the 
trial or incorporated into the written appeal. Article Nine-
teen (19), Sec. 3(b). 
Had Nance and Hanley wanted to refute any of the 
findings of the trial board or to expose any of the alleged 
political machinations on the part of President Byron or 
any other General Officers, they had ample opportunity 
to cite these matters in their appeals and submit affidavits 
or other documentary evidence to corroborate them. They 
would then have given the association an opportunity to 
rule on those issues in the first instance, and to remedy 
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forthwith any errors made by the trial board or any abuses 
of power on the part of their General Officers. But they 
declined to be specific with respect to such matters in their 
written appeals. 
It cannot be said now that errors or mistakes commit-
ted by the trial board would not have been remedied upon 
appeal if proper supporting evidence had been submitted. 
In fact, the indications are all to the contrary, as is evi-
denced by the Grievances and Appeals Committee's exhon-
oration of the charge against Hanley that he improperly 
directed John Fuller to act as a representative of Local 
Union 371 without authority to do so. This is the only 
charge that Hanley attempted to refute by documentary 
evidence incorporated into his written appeal. 
To the extent that Hanley and Nance had refuting evi-
dence which~they neglected or failed to annex to their writ-
ten appeals, they to such extent failed to exhaust their 
remedies within the association, and, thus, would not be en-
titled to any relief in the courts. See: THE LAw OF LABOR 
UNIONs, DANGEL AND SHRIBER, §186, p. 211-215, in support 
of this well-recognized rule requiring exhaustion of inter-
nal remedies within the organization. 
The failure of Hanley and Nance to take advantage of 
their rights upon appeal within the union should not, there-
fore, become the basis for a finding that their remedies up-
on such appeal were inadequate. The trial court below 
erred in so ruling. 
44 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
THE COFRT ERRED IN HOLDIXG THAT THE AC-
TIONS OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT UNION AND 
:-.;ol\lE OF ITS OF.,FICERS WERE l\IALICIOUS, AR-
BITRARY, AND UNREASONABLE IN CONNECTIOK 
vVITH THE PREFERRING OF CHARGES, TRIAL 
PROCEEDINGS, AND APPEAL THROUGH THE UNI-
ON TRIBUNALS 
On December 30, 1958, the trial court found that the 
trials afforded Hanley and Nance denied them rights under 
the Union constitution and under principles of due pro-
cess of law. This was the sole basis for finding that the 
expulsions were void and ordering Defendant-Appellant 
Union to reinstate them to membership forthwith. 
Approximately five months later the trial court in a 
supplemental memorandum of decision found that the ex-
pulsion proceedings were not only illegal but also malicious, 
arbitrary, and unreasonable. See: Second Supplemental 
Memorandum of Decision (R. 600-614). It was not contem-
plated that these findings as to malice or bad faith would 
be considered as a ground for holding the expulsions of 
Hanley and Nance illegal, since they had already been held 
illegal, but, rather, such findings were to bear on the ques-
tion whether punitive damages would lie. See: Pre- T. 9-5-
58. 2-5 and Order As To Issues To Be Submitted To .Jury 
(R. 367-369). This is also clear from a reading of the trial 
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and his 
Judgment and Decree. (R. 641-657). Had the previonf; 
ruling, rendered on December 30, 1958, in the l\tfemorandum 
of Decision, been that the expulsions were not illegal under 
the Union constitution or applicable principles of due pro-
cess of law, the case at bar would have ended, and Nance's 
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Petition for Writ of Mandate and Hanley's Complaint in 
Intervention would have been dismissed. 
Therefore, if the court agrees with our argument under 
Point I above, the decision of the trial court should be re-
versed and dismissed, and none of the other points to be 
argued hereafter would need to be reached. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
CHARGES WERE NOT PREFERRED IN GOOD FAITH 
The most important "bad faith" contention made by 
Hanley and Nance during the trial in the court below was 
to the effect that President Byron preferred false charges 
against them in bad faith, purely for the purpose of pre-
venting them from sponsoring two resolutions at Defend-
ant-Appellant Union's General Convention to be held in 
Montreal, Canada, in August of 1954. 
It would be disingenuous to fail to acknowledge the 
fact that there was testimony, days and weeks of testimony, 
on the subject whether President Byron and other General 
Officers knew of Hanley's and Nance's political plans and, 
if so, whether they opposed them. The court found, erron-
eously we believe, that President Byron knew of these plans 
and opposed and resented them, and that he preferred 
charges against Nance and Hanley partly, at least, to pre-
vent them from supporting the two resolutions at the Gen-
eral Convention. Regardless of such conclusion, however, 
the filing of the charges was warranted and justified. 
The trial court at the same time found that President 
Byron had received reports which, if believed, would have 
justified his preferring charges against them. (R. 647-648). 
These were the Stetter reports and the communications 
from Ira Fulmor and Henry Ely. The reports from those 
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sources which implicated I-Ianley and (to a somewhat lesser 
extent) Nance in a murder, in shakedown activities against 
contractors, etc., were so shocking that President Byron 
would virtually have been impelled to charge them with 
misconduct, and force them to defend themselves against 
those despicable accusations. President Byron, or any 
other Union leader, would himself have been guilty of 
gToss misconduct had he refused to take action after re-
reiving such serious documented evidence of misconduct 
on the part of members of his organization. 
0 
Thus, at most, the evidence adduced on this issue of 
good faith in the preferring of the charges gave rise to 
two conflicting inferences. In these circumstances it was 
error for the court to draw the inference of bad faith. As 
pointed out in 20 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 224 On the sub-
ject of inferences and presumptions of good faith, honesty 
and fair dealing: 
'' .... It is further presumed that men intend to do 
what they have the right and power to do, rather than· 
what is beyond their right and power. In those cases 
where different inferences may be drawn from the 
same state of circumstances it is the duty of the court 
to presume in favor of innocent conduct, rather than 
intentional and guilty misconduct.'' 
See also: N.L.R.B. v. Hu,ber & Huber .Z11otor Exp., 223 F2d 
748, 749 ( C.A. 5th 1955) where the court said: 
" .... As stated above, the record discloses that 
there existed several reasons for the unpopularity of 
Barnett, both with the management and with the Union 
Officers, and where the Board could as reasonably· in-
fer a proper collateral motive as an unlawful one, the 
act of the management rannot be set aside by the 
Board as being improperly motivated.'' 
Accord: Schofield v. ZCMI, Utah, 39 P. 2d 342, 345 (1934). 
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Actually, here the inference of good faith in preferring 
the charges is much stronger than the contrary one, be-
cause ·it is based upon facts which if reported to a:ny rea-
sonable man would have induced him to take the same ac-
tion as President Byron, i.e.: prefer charges. 
The trial court found that President Byron delayed 
too long before preferring charges and did not do so until 
he learned of Hanley's and Nance's political activities. (R. 
647-648). This is wholly unfounded. 
To reach this erroneous conclusion the trial court had 
to find that President Byron should have preferred charg-
es against Hanley and Nance solely on the basis of some 
unverified reports of misconduct given to him by represen-
tatives of certain Los Angeles contractors. These reports 
were made first in December of 1953 and then again in Feb-
ruary of 1954. The trial court evidently felt that Presi-
dent Byron either should not have bothered to make his own 
investigation using Grant Stetter, Murphey and O'Malley, 
or that he should not have waited until such investigation 
had been completed, which was around the 9th of ~fay, 
1954, before preferring the very serious charges against 
Hanley and Nance. (N.J.T. 4926-4927). Neither premise 
is tenable, of course, and the record establishes that Byron 
acted prudently and with reasonable dispatch in preferring 
the charges. 
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THE C<>rHT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
Jl ~1\lBERS OF THE TRIAL COI\Il\IITTEE WERE 
UNDULY INFLUENCED IN THE CONDUCT OF 
THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS AND IN THEIR 
DECISION BY A DESIRE TO COOPERATE 
\VITH PRESIDENT BYRON IN HIS EFFORTS 
TO EXPEL HANL:BJY AND NANCE 
The finding that the members of the Trial Com-
mittee were "unduly influenced" in the conduct of the 
trial proceedings and in their decision by a desire to co-
operate with President Byron in his efforts to expel Han-
ley and Nance is wholly unsupported by evidence and also 
confusing. 
The trial court did not hold that the Union trial board, 
or any member of it, was biased against Hanley and Nance, 
nor did the court hold that they would not have had fair 
trials if they had stood trial before it. Quite to the contrary, 
the trial court below held the expulsions of Hanley and 
Nance were void specifically because they were not pres-
ent at their trials before that very trial board. (R. 651-
652). 
The transcript of the three days of "open hearings," 
best proves the fact that the trial board of Defendant-Ap-
pellant Union gave Hanley and Nance "every break in the 
books.'' They did not recess the trials prematurely, but 
only after three aggravating sessions that would have 
broken the patience of Job. From such a record, it cannot 
be inferred that their decision to recess the hearings and 
resume them in absentia was "unduly influenced" by some 
ulterior desire to cooperate with President Byron. 
With respect to the reasonableness or correctness of 
the trial board's decision finding Hanley and Nance guilty 
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of the charges preferred against them, this is a matter that 
the court never inquired into, and which is not an issue in 
the case. See: Pre-T., 9-5-58, 2-·5. To the extent that there 
is any misapprehension on this point, however, we submj.t 
that there was substantial evidence received during their 
trials in absentia which more than supports the findings 
of the trial board. See : Exh. 7 and 10. 
THE REMAINING FINDINGS OF BAD FAITH 
AND UNREASONABLENESS IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE TRIALS IN ABSENTIA AND 
APPEALS ARE MERE ADDITIONAL 
INFERENCES DRAWN FRO:Vf THE FACTS 
The other findings of the trial court respecting ar-
bitrariness, malice, and bad faith are mainly based upon a 
reevaluation of the conduct of the trial board, the General 
President, and the General Convention with respect to 
matters such as denying requests for continuances and bills 
of particulars and even of the act of permitting Hanley and 
Nance to be tried in absentia. The trial court merely be-
latedly characterized them as arbitary, unreasonable, and 
malicious in nature, as well as illegal. 
\Ve have already argued that the denials of those re-
quests and motions was brought about because Hanley and 
Nance never consented to the trial board's rules of proce-
dure and, thus, the trials were never in session so that such 
matters were up for rulings. Such conduct was therefore 
not illegal; a fortiori, it was not arbitary, unreasonable or 
malicious. The findings and conclusions of the trial court 
as to these matters of malice and bad faith should be re-
versed. 
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POINT III 
THE (~()URT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PUNITIVE 
(EXEMPLARY) DA1fAGES SHOULD BE AWARDED 
FOR PLAINTIFFS- RESPONDENTS' WRONGFUL 
EXPFLSIONS FROM UNION MEMBERSHIP AND 
FURTHER ERRED IN AMERCING DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT UNION WITH PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
FOR MISCONDUCT OF ITS OFFICERS IN THE AB-
SENCE OF A SHOWING OF RATIFICATION BY THE 
UNION OF SUCH ALLEGED WANTON OR MALI-
CIOUS CONDUCT 
Points III, IV, and V will be considered under this 
heading and argued as one. 
A. The Court Erred As a Matter of Law in Allowing 
Punitive Damages in M and am us and Injunction 
Proceedings. 
Plaintiff-Respondent Nance filed his action herein 
in the form of a Petition for Writ of Mandate. Our re-
search of authorities has failed to bring to light a sing·le 
instance in which a court has awarded punitive ( exemp-
lary) damages in a mandamus proceeding. There is no 
statement in any standard reference work, such as AMERI-
CAK JuRISPRUDENCE or CoRPUS JuRIS SECUNDUM, that sup-
ports the recovery of punitive damages in a mandamus suit. 
On the other hand, in 32 CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 2d 287 
it is stated: 
"It is extremely doubtful whether the court in a 
mandamus proceeding could or should award exemp-
lary damages.'' 
The conclusion that punitive damages are not obtain-
able in a mandamus suit is fortified by the fact that man-
damus is a special form of action which is essentially 
51 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
equitable in nature; that is to say, it is a proceeding in 
which equitable principles are applicable. See: 34 .AMERI-
CAN JURISPRUDENCE 829; 32 CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE 2d 
119. 
These equitable rules, then, would apply to Nance's 
Petition for Writ of Mandate as well as to Hanley's Com-
plaint in Intervention, which is purely a proceeding in 
equity for injunctive relief and damages. In a compre-
hensive annotation in 48 .A.L.R. 2d 948, the authors state 
that the majority rule, adopted in all but a few states, is 
that punitive or exemplary damages may not be recovered 
in a proceeding in equity. At page 950 of the annotation, 
it says: 
''The several theories advanced by the courts as 
the basis for the rule that punitive damages may not 
be recovered in courts of equity are: (1) .A court of 
equity does not have the power to award punitive dam-
ages; (2) the awarding of punitive damages is incom-
patible with the principles and practice of equity; and 
(3) by seeking equitable relief, a litigant waives all 
claim to punitive damages. It should be noted that in 
refusing to award punitive damages the courts have 
frequently based their holdings upon several or all 
of these theories. 
'' There are, however, a number of cases in which 
the courts have denied punitive damages in equity or 
have recognized that such damages may not be recov-
ered in equity without stating upon what theory they 
based their decision.'' 
According to the annotation, at least 18 states plainly 
hold that punitive damages may not be recovered in equit-
able proceedings, and only two jurisdictions, to wit: Cali-
fornia and Tennessee, definitely allow them. 
It is not clear where Utah stands in respect to this 
proposition, but we submit that the majority rule is based 
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upon sound principles and ought to be followed. To allow 
punitive damages to lie in equitable proceedings would go 
far towards destroying all remaining distinctions between 
legal and equitable actions, 
B. The Court Erred As a Matter of Law in Allowing 
P~tnitive Darnages For A Breach of Contract. 
The general rule of contract law with respect to dam-
ages is that the plaintiff is limited to a recovery of the ac-
tual loss he has sustained by reason of the breach. 15 
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 442. With respect to punitive 
damages it is said in 15 AMERICAN JuRISPRUDENCE 709: 
'' .... According to the overwhelming weight of 
authority, exemplary damages are not recoverable in 
actions for breach of contract, although there are dicta 
and intimations in some of the cases to the contrary." 
While Hanley and Nance are proceeding in equitable 
actions, the wrong that they seek to remedy is in the na-
ture of a breach of contract. A wrongful expulsion from a 
labor union is a breach of the contract of membership be-
tween the member and the union. Recently, in !.A.M. v. 
Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 2 L.ed. 1018 (1958) the Supreme 
Court held: 
P. 618 ". : . under California law membership 
in a labor union constitutes a contract between the 
member and the union, the terms of which are govern-
ed by the constitution and by-laws of the union, and 
that state law provides, through mandatory reinstate-
ment and damages, a remedy for breach of such con-
tract through wrongful expulsion. This contractual 
conception of the relation between a member and his 
union widely prevails in this country .... " 
In accord is Pratt v. Amal. Ass. of Street & Elec. Rwy. 
Emp. of Am., Utah, 167 Pac. 830 (1917). 
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Punitive damages were sought but not recovered in 
Gonzales, supra, which was also a mandamus suit. Chief 
Justice Warren, speaking in dissent, said at page 628: 
'' .... The right of action for emotional disturb-
ance, like the punitive recovery the plaintiff sought un-
successfully in this case, is a particularly unwelcome 
addition to the scheme of federal remedies because of 
the random nature of any assessment of damages." 
(Emphasis ours.) 
Other cases denying punitive damages for breaches of 
contract are Fordson Coal Co. v. Kentucky River Ooal 
Oorp. 69 F. 2d 131 ( C.A. 6th 1934); Young v. Main, 72 F2d 
640 ( C.A. 8th 1934); Steiner v. Rowley, 35 Cal 2d 713, 221 
P. 2d 9 (1950); Chelini v. }lieri, 32 Cal 2d 480, 196 P. 2d 
915 (1948); and White v. Metropolitan Merchandise .. liJart, 
107 A. 2d 892 (Del. 1954). 
Punitive damages should accordingly have been de-
nied in the case at bar on the ground that they do not lie 
for breach of a contract of union membership. 
C. The Court Erred in Not Subm,itting the Issue of 
Punitive Dam,ages to the Jury, If They Were Al-
lowable. 
If we assume that the issue of punitive damages was 
properly allowed in this case, the court still erred in not 
submitting such issues to the jury. Some punitive dam-
age issues were submitted to the jury at the trial below but 
not all of them. The jury found that the Defendant-Appel-
lant Union was not guilty of any malice or bad faith and 
that Hanley and Nance were entitled to no punitive dam-
ages, and, in fact, no damages at all. The only punitive 
damages allowed in the case were those assessed by the 
court itself. 
The general rule as to the allowance of punitive dam-
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ages and the rule which we believe applies in Utah, is that 
they an' strictly and peculiarly within the province and dis-
('retion of the jury. A good statement of this rule is found 
in ran Lom v. Schneider ill an, 210 P. 2d 461, 469, 11 A.L.R. 
:!d 1195, 1206 (Sup. Ct. Ore. 1949) : 
''In the trial of a case where exemplary damages 
are sought the judge determines as a matter of law 
whether there is evidence of malice, and, if he decides 
that there is, the assessment of such damages is com-
mitted to the discretion of the jury. Cholia v. Kelty, 
155 Or 287, 291, 63 P2d 895; Martin v. Cambas, 134 Or 
:237, 262, 293 P 601; Gill v. Selling, 125 Or 587, 591, 267 
P 812, 58 ALR 1556. The Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States says: 'This has always been left to the dis-
cretion of the j?.try, as the degree of punishment to be 
thus inflicted must depend on the peculiar circum-
stances of each case.' Day v. Woodworth, 13 How 363, 
371, 14 L Ed 181. And the jury has entire diseretion 
to refrain from giving any punitive damages at all 
even though all the elements of malicious and damag-
ing misconduct may have been established. McCor-
mick on Damages 296, §84; 4 Sedgwick on Damages 
2660, §1318. '' (Emphasis ours.) 
See also: '53 AMERICAN tTURISPRUDENCE 167-168. 
D. E1·en if Punitive Damages Were Allowable, the 
Court Erred in Assessing them Against Defend-
ant-Appellant Union in the Absence of a Finding 
that the Malice or Bad Faith of the Union Officers 
TV as Known to or Ratified by the llf ember ship. 
Defendant-Appellant Union as a voluntary, unincor-
porated association consists of, and has no identity sep-
arate from, its entire membership. A union's citizen.ship, 
for instance, is coextensive with the citizenship of all its 
members. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. 1Jfarine & 
Shipbuilding Workers~ etc., 95 F. Supp 50 (D.C. Pa. 1951); 
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Ex Parte Edelstein, 30 F2d 636 (C.A. 2d 1929), cert. denied 
279 u.s. 851. 
As the Supreme Court of New Jersey held in M archit-
to v. Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, 88 A2d 
851 (1952), a union is a common enterprise or joint venture 
in which each of the members is a co-principal with all of 
the others. There the court said: 
P. 856 " .... It [the union] is not a separate legal entity 
in the eyes of the law, having no existence apart from 
that of its individual members. At common-law it 
couldneither sue nor be sued .... In legal effect plain-
tiff and every other member of the Brotherhood are 
co-principals joined together in a joint enterprise to 
accomplish a common purpose with their relationships 
to each other and to the group being governed by the 
association's constitution and the by-laws or rules 
adopted pursuant thereto, and by the common law.'' 
A judgment against Defendant-Appellant Union is en-
forced against its treasury, which is the joint property or 
asset of the entire membership. It is thus necessarily true 
that to mulct the Union with punitive damages is indirectly 
to assess them against the whole membership. We submit 
that, regardless of the rule as to the liability of the union 
for actual damages proximately caused by acts of their of-
ficers or agents, the bad faith or malice of such officers or 
agents ought not to be imputed to the membership in the· 
absence of a showing that the membership knew of the 
malicious nature of the acts and approved or ratified the 
same. 
This point was decided in Lawlor v. Loewe, 187 Fed. 
522 (C.A. 2d 1911), cert. denied 223 U.S. 729 (1912) where 
the court said at page 526: 
'' .... Surely the fact that an individual joins an 
association having such a clause in its constitution can-
not be taken as expressing assent by him to the per-
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petration of arson or murder. Something more must 
be shown, as, for instance, that with the knowledge 
of the members unlawful means had been so frequently 
used with the express or tacit approval of the associa-
tion, that its agents were warranted in assuming that 
they might use such unlawful means in the future, that 
the association and its individual members would ap-
prov.e or tolerate such use whenever the end sought to 
be obtained might be best obtained thereby.'' 
To the same effect is Sweetman v. Barrows, 161 N.E. 272 
(Mass. Sup. Ct. 1928) ; Schneider v. Local 60, 116 La. 
270, ·5 L.R.A. (N.S.) 891 (1905); and in Martin v. Curran, 
303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E. 2d 683, 685, 686 ( 1951) the New York 
Court of Appeals held that in a libel action against officers 
of a union sued in their representative capacities there 
had to be allegations and proof that such libels in the uni-
on's newspapers were ratified by the membership. There, 
the court said : 
''A voluntary, unincorporated membership asso-
ciation is neither a partnership nor a corporation. It 
is not an artificial person, and has no existence inde-
pendent of its members. Ostrom v. Greene, 161 N.Y. 
353, 361; see Niven v. Spickerman & Stever, 12 Johns. 
401. No agency of one member for another is implied. 
McCabe v. Goodfellow, 133 N.Y. 89, 95, supra. 'A part 
of the members of a voluntary organization cannot 
bind the others without their consent before the act 
which it is claimed binds them is done, or they, with 
full knowledge of the facts, ratify and adopt it.' Sizer 
Y. Daniels, 66 Barb. 426, 432-433. So, until the passage 
of the statutes which were the precursors of article 3 of 
the present. General Association Law, all the members 
of such a group were necessary parties defendant in 
any suit on an alleged association liability, and could 
not be sued through their officers. Van Aernam \~. 
Bleistein, 102 N.Y. 355, 358. 
:11: :11: :11: 
' 'So, for better or worse, wisely or otherwise, the 
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Legislature has limited such suits against association 
officers, whether for breaches of agreements Qr for 
tortious wrongs, to cases where the individual liabil-
ity of every single member can be alleged and proven. 
Despite procedural changes, substantive liability in 
such cases is still, as it was at common law,' that of the 
members severally'. Sperry Products, Inc. v. Associa-
tion of Amer. R.R., 132 F. 2d 408, 410, certiorari de-
nied 319 U.S. 744. 'In the kind of association now un-
der consideration, only those members are liable who 
expressly or impliedly with full knowledge authorize 
or ratify the specific acts in question'. Wrightington 
on Unincorporated Associations and Business Trusts, 
§64. '' (Emphasis ours.) 
The court below never found that the membership of 
the Union, or their representatives, the delegates to the 
General Convention, ever learned that Presidnt Byron act-
ed in bad faith or maliciously in preferring charges against 
Hanley or Nance. Similarly, the court never found that' 
~ny alleged malice or ill will or undue influence on the part 
of the trial board or the Grievances and Appeals Commit-
tee was brought to the attention of the membership. More-
over, Hanley and Nance, by failing to incorporate any evi-
dentary matter into their written appeals, did not do any-
thing to apprise the membership of the Union of malice 
or bad faith on the part of any officer or agent of the Union. 
The membership of Defendant-Appellant Union did 
not have any opportunity to ratify any alleged malice or 
bad faith in connection with Plaintiffs-Respondents' expul-
sions because they never learned of it, and, therefore, even 
assuming that in a case such as this punitive damegs could 
be awarded, they would lie only against those members 
and officers who had evil motive and intent in connection 
with the expulsion proceedings. None of those persons 
was named as a defendant in the case at bar, however. 
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E. If Jras l'.J'rror for the Court to Award Nominal 
/)n 111aqes after the Jury Returned a Verdict that' 
No Compensatory Damaqes Were Suffered by 
Either of the Plaintiffs-ResJW1ulents 
So far as the record of this case reveals, every dam-
age issue involved was to be submitted to the jury, except 
for those limited issues which the trial judge kept from the 
jury pursuant to his Order As to Issue to Be Submitted to 
the Jury. (R. 367-369). The trial court never reserved for 
himself the right to rule upon any elements of actual or 
compensatory damages. See Pre-T., 1-13-59, 11-12. Note 
also the following colloquy between the court below and 
counsel at page 50 of the January 13, 1959, pre-trial con-
ference: 
"THE COURT: Under the suggestion of the court, 
the question of bad faith or malice up to the time of 
the expulsion would be left to the court, including any 
punitiYe damages for that if the question were found 
in favor of the [Plaintiffs-Respondents]. 
'' ::\'IR. FISHER: Yes, but how about the compensa-
tory damages~ 
"THE COURT: Beg pardon~ All the compensatory 
damages would be left to the jury." 
and further at page 51 thereof: 
'' ~IR. SANDA OK: In other words, if we were to so 
stipulate, yon would still allow this jury to hear ele-
ments of compensatory damages, including pain, suf-
fering, humilation for the pre-expulsion period which 
would in effect allow Nance and Hanley to reopen 
their testimony as to humiliation, pain and suffering in 
that pre-expulsion period which might go back of May 
15th? 
":JIR. DREYER: :May I be heard on that, your Hon-
or~ All that v\·e can recover by way of compensatory 
damages is damages that naturally and proximately 
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flowed from the expulsion. I don't see how pain and 
suffering prior to .the expulsion or pain and mental 
distress can have anything to do with it. 
''MR. SANDACK: Or Humiliation. 
''MR. DREYER: It is the damages flowing from 
the expulsion that is included in the compensatory 
damages. 
'"MR. FISHER: I am not too convinced of that Mr. 
Dreyer, unless you want to stipulate that. If the court 
would make a finding that there was malice in the 
original preferment of charges, I would have some 
question as to whether humiliation and mental anguish 
suffered from the date the charges were first issued 
might not possibly be an element of the case. 
''MR. DREYER: I think it would be part of the 
punitive damages." 
The court below, therefore, had no justification for 
belatedly reevaluating the same evidence that the jury 
scrutinized and giving Nance and Hanley nominal damag-
es where the jury previously ruled that neither of them 
was entitled to even one cent. Counsel for the Plaintiffs-
Respondents state at page 5 of their Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Reconsid-
eration of Ord~r on Motion to Settle Record (filed in the 
Supreme Court of January 22, 1960): 
''Among other things [Defendant-Appellant Uni-
·on], as shown by its statement of points, is attack-
ing the trial court's award of nominal domages. That 
award is based entirely on thP evidence adduced at the 
trial tohich began on February 9, 1959. (Emphasis 
ours.) 
This was an attempt indirectly to give them a judg-
ment n.o.v. when, as a matter of law, as the trial court 
properly ruled, they were not entitled to it. 
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F. It JV as Error for the Trial Court to Award Puni-
tive Dama,ges Without Having an Award of Com-
pensatory Damages Upon which to Base It 
In any event, however, the award of punitive damages 
in this case is erroneous as a matter of law because in Utah, 
as in the vast majority of states, punitive damages are not 
allowed unless compensatory damages based on the tor-
tious or illegal conduct are recovered. Such as the rul-
ing of this court in Graham v. Street, et al, Utah, 270 P. 2d 
456, 459 ( 1954). There the court held: 
"Defendants next contend that the court erred 
in allowing $5,000.00 punitive damages. We agree. 
As was the case with compensatory damages, there 
are no specific pleadings, only a general allegation of 
fraud in the amended complaint. Standing alone, the 
failure to s.et forth a specific pleading may not be fa-
tal since the damage may follow as a conclusion of law 
from the allegation of fraud, 15 Am. Jur., Damages, 
Sec. 304: however, the general rule is that there can 
be no pttnitive damages without compensatory dam-
ages based on the tort. Gilham v. Devereaux, 67 Mon. 
75, 214 P. 606, 33 A.L.R. 381. And see Falkenburg v. 
Neff, 72 Utah 258, 269 P. 1008; Evans v. Garsford, 
Utah, 247 P. 2d 431; and cases cited in annotation in 
33 A.L.R. 384. Hence, the failure to allege and prove 
a tort giving rise to compensatory damages vitiates 
the claim for punitive damage. (Emphasis ours.) 
See also the comprehensive new annotation on punitive 
damages in 17 A.L.R. 2d 527 et seq. 
Only a minority of jurisdictions permit an award of 
punitive damages to be based upon nominal damages and 
Utah is not among them. 17 A.L.R. 2d. '542-545. 
The Graham case would seem conclusively to estab-
lish the error of the court below in awarding punitive 
damages in this case. 
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G. The Award of Punitive Damages is Erroneous 
Because It Is Wholly Disproportionate to the 
N aminal Award 
Even if Utah allowed the recovery of punitive dam-
ages based on an award merely of nominal damages, the 
grossness of the verdict for punitive damages in the pres-
ent case would nevertheless be erroneous. In Utah there 
is the additional requirement that the punitive award must 
bear some reasonable relationship to the amount of actual 
damages recovered. Falkenberg v. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 269 
Pac. 1008 (1928) (where a verdict of $5,000.00 punitive to 
$362.50 compensatory was held excessive, and the court 
ordered a remitter of $3,500.00). This rule is still in effect 
in Utah, as it is in a number of other jurisdictions; and in 
Ostertag v. LaMont, Utah, 339 P2d 1022, 1024 (1959) this 
honorable court recently said: 
'' .... The jury fr01n its advantaged position must 
necessarily be allowed a broad discretion in such mat-
ters. It is true that this court has stated a number of 
times that the punitive damages must bear some rea-
sonable relationship to actual damages. This is so be-
cause they must not be so disproportionate as to man-
ifest that they were awarded as a result of passion or 
prejudice, or under misconception of, or in disregard 
of the law or the evidence. But the relationship of the 
punitive damages to actual damages awarded is only 
one of the facts to be considered in determining wheth-
er the amount awarded should be sustained.'' 
See also: annotation in 17 A.L.R. 2d at 548-549. 
The two punitive verdicts in the case at bar of $20,-
000.00 each based upon nominal recoveries of $1.00 each, 
are so wildly disproportionate as to be virtually prejudi-
cial per se. These verdicts, moreover, were imposed, in 
part, on account of the fact that the Union had the temerity 
to defend this case in the first place (although the Union 
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was the defendant) and, because the trial below cost the 
eounty and its taxpayers some money. (R. 652-653). Evi-
dently, the court below saw fit to penalize Defendant-Ap-
pellant Union for defending itself instead of confessing 
judgment in a case in which its actions were proper in the 
circumstances and the plaintiffs themselves were guilty of 
serious n1isconduct. The court, thus, in its Findings of 
B,aet and Conclusions of Law held that ''In determining the 
amount of exemplary damages the following matters are 
entitled to consideration: 
(a) That trial in absentia, where there has been no 
consent or waiver, is abhorrent to the principles of jus-
tice and fairplay. 
(b) That in this case the wealth and power of an in-
ternational union was arrayed against individual 
union members with meager resources. 
(c) That appeals were timely taken, and respond-
ent's officers and its Grievances and Appeals Commit-
tee refused to reverse the action of the Trial Commit-
tee despite the fact that the· transcript of the trial pro-
ceedings unmistakably showed that the trials had been 
had in the absence of the accused and without their 
consent and obviously over their objections. 
(d) That continuously since on or about July 1, 1954, 
the petitioner and intervenor have been known andre-
ferred to as expelled members and have been deprived 
of the benefits and privileges of union membership. 
(e) That petitioner and intervenor have been put to 
the expense of a costly and very prolonged trial, over 
constant objections of respondent and two intermedi-
ate appeals, in order to obtain redress in the court. 
(f) That taxpayers have been burdened with the ex-
pense of a greatly prolonged trial despite the fact that 
respondent's officers and its Trial Committee and ap-
pellate tribunal had full knowledge that trials of peti-
tioner and intervenor upon the charges herein involv-
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ed had been held in their absence, without their consent 
and over their obvious objections. 
(g) That the respondent in upholding the action of 
its officers and Trial Committee is attempting to de-
fend trial in absentia - a hateful thing in any civil-
ized society." 
The reasons assigned by the court as warranting the im-
position of punitive damages are not only improper but 
highly prejudicial. 
These reasons would also support the reversal of the 
punitive damage award herein, even if the other grounds 
were not sufficient. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ISSUE 
AND THE POWER TO ENFORCE A WRIT OF MAN-
DATE OR A MANDATORY INJUNCTION AGAINST A 
NON-RESIDENT UNICORPORATED LABOR ASSO-
CIATION COMPELLING SUCH ASSOCIATION TO 
REINSTATE PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN RE-
FUSING TO QUASH SERVICE OF PROCESS AND 
DISMISS ACTIONS BECAUSE DEFENDANT-AP-
PELLANT UNION IS NOT SUBJECT TO PROCESS 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
A. Defendant-Appellant Union Was Not, And Is Not, 
Subject to Service of Process in the State of Utah 
Since None of the Acts Complained of by Plain-
tiffs-Respondents Arose Out of any Business 
Transacted By Defendant-Appellant Union in the 
State of Utah 
Points VI and VII will be argued as one. 
Two settled doctrines of Utah law were specially plead-
ed in Defendant-Appellant Union's Motion to Quash the 
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Alternative \Vrit of Mandate. (R. 8, 9). The motion was 
overruled (R. 25) by the court below. 
(1) The court lacked jurisdiction to enforce extra-
territorially the mandatory injunction order against non-
resident labor association; and 
(2) No jurisdiction was acquired over the person of 
this out of state association. 
These pleas were raised by special appearance prior 
to answer and stand to date unwaived on the record. 
In Pratt v. Amalgamated ..Association of Street & Elec-
trical Railway Employees of America, Utah, 167 Pac 830 
at page 835, this court early held: 
''No one, we think, will be bold enough to assert 
that we could enforce our judgment outside the state. 
If, therefore, we enter a judgment, and the defendants 
refuse to convene, and take the action required of them, 
by what means could we coerce them to comply with 
the judgment.'' 
In Pratt, plaintiff commenced a proceeding to compel 
the defendants to reinstate him as a member of defendant's 
association, a labor union, claiming an illegal expulsion. 
The defendants lived in different states of the union, one 
having his home in Salt Lake City. The principal office 
of the association was Detroit, Michigan. It had under its 
control subsidiary associations called local divisions in 
various states of the United States and Canada. The hold-
ing in Pratt squarely supports Defendant-Appellant Uni-
on's theory that the lower court had neither the power nor 
jurisdiction to grant and especially to enforce a writ of 
mandate directed against a non-resident, unincorporated 
labor association compelling reinstatement of respondents. 
The court further erred in refusing to quash service 
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of process for the reason that Defendant-Appellant Union 
was not subject to service of process in the State of Utah. 
In W ein v. Crockett, Utah, 195 P. 2d 222 (1948), the 
making of a single contract within this state was sufficient 
for the court to establish jurisdiction under 78-27-20, U.C.A. 
1953, '' ... in any action arising out of the conduct of such 
business.'' Critical to this decision was the court's recog-
nition that the cause of action arose in Utah, the availabil-
ity of Utah witnesses, and the laws of Utah controlled and 
governed the cause. 
In W ein, the court did not feel it an unreasonable im-
position to require a non-resident to defend at the place in 
which he committed the alleged wrong and where the wit-
nesses would be available for trial. 
Hanley is a non-resident of Utah (N.J.T. 28). Nance 
claimed a residence at Nephi, Utah (N.J.T. l520) through 
his wife's interest in a home. All of Nance's employment 
was outside the state, at his "temporary residence" in Las 
Vegas, Nevada (N.J.T. 1425). The activities of which 
they vigorously complain took place, by their own story, 
in Las Vegas, Nevada ; Miami, Florida; Los Angeles, Cali-
fornia; Chicago, Illinois; Washington, D. C.; Montreal, 
Canada ; Tucson and Phoenix, Arizona. 
It is undisputed that Defendant-Appellant Union is a 
voluntary, unincorporated labor association with its prin-
cipal office in Washington, D. C. (R.6). Article One, Sec-
tion 1, Constitution. No representative or agent author-
ized to act for or on behalf of Defendant-Appellant Union 
resided in Utah (R. 12). 
If Tll ein extends 4( e) ( 4), U.R.C.P. against non-resi-
dent individuals or associations, even for a single business 
transaction or a single tort, it must be predicated on actions 
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which arise out of business done by the non-resident in the 
State of Utah. This critical point is entirely absent from 
all claims of the Plaintiffs-Respondents. 
Therefore, no jurisdiction ever legally attached against 
the Defendant-Appellant Union which Plaintiffs-Respond-
ents were entitled to ground either of their lawsuits. 
POINT VIII 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN AL-
LOWING EACH OF THE PLAINTIFFS - RESPOND-
ENTS TO RECOVER THEIR ATTORNEYS FEES 
AGAINST DEFENDANT-APPELLANT UNION 
The attorneys fees issue in this case was also decided 
erroneously. 
We do not dispute the fact that in proper circumstanc-
es Nance would be entitled to an allowance of a reasonable 
attorney's fee as an element of damages, provided, of 
course, he should prevail in his mandamus suit. He is not 
entitled to prevail in his madamus suit, however, but, re-
gardless of that, his contract for services of counsel is such 
that he suffered no damages or loss on account of employ-
ing them, and, thus, in those circumstances, he can not 
properly claim attorneys fees as an element of his dam-
ages. 
Hanley, on the other hand, did not proceed on a man-
damus theory, so that he is not entitled to an allowance of 
attorney fees in any circumstances under the law of Utah. 
The general theory or rule is that attorneys fees may 
not be recovered by the prevailing party as an element of 
damages or as part of the allowance of court costs. In 15 
AMERICAN JuRISPRUDENCE 550, it is said: 
''As a general rule, in the absence of any con-
tractual or statutory liability therefor, attorneys' fees 
and expenses incurred by the plaintiff or which the 
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plaintiff is obligated to pay, in the litigation of his 
claim against the defendant, aside from usual court 
costs, are not recoverable as an item of damages, eith-
er in an action ex contractu or an action ex delicto." 
In Utah the legislature has engrafted certain excep-
tions to the general rule quoted above, and one of the few 
kinds of civil actions in which attorneys fees are recover-
able by a prevailing party as part of his damages is man-
damus. This exception is expressly recognized in Colo-
rado Development Co. v. Creer, 96 Utah 1, 80 P. 2d 914 
(1938). 
But the Colorado Development Co. case, supra, 
made it clear that attorneys fees are not properly a part 
of damages unless the prevailing party has in fact suffer-
ed loss of income by incurring attorneys fees and thus 
truly is ''damaged.'' He must have, in other words, paid, 
or contracted to pay, an ascertainable sum to his counsel 
as attorneys fees. As this court said in syllabus 19 to the 
Oolorado Development Co. case, supra: 
"In mandamus proceeding, knowledge of court as 
to value of services of attorney revealed by words and 
records on file and appearances of counsel would be 
insufficient to justify an award of attorneys fees as 
damages within statute without other evidence as to 
contract to pay or actual payment for services." (Em-
phasis ours.) 
The fee arrangements between Hanley and Nance and 
their attorneys, McCune and Dreyer, is absolutely incred-
ible. Nance himself knew nothing of his fee arrangement 
except that vaguely it was contingent. (Post-T. 4/27/59, 
98-99). Dreyer felt that the arrangement was for a 50% 
contingent fee, with which McCune agreed. (Post-T. 
4/27/59, 115, 120). In addition, there was some even vaguer 
agreement among the attorneys only that, if they recov-
ered no money for their clients but succeeded nevertheless 
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in having them reinstated, their clients would H@VeFtas 
~ then, pay them a ''reasonable fee.'' The clients, Han-
ley and Nance, were not shown to have ever expressly 
agreed to this. 
The trial court wrongfully allowed the two Plaintiffs-
Respondents punitive damages of $40,000.00, out of which, 
if it is allowed to stand, the two attorneys, McCune and 
Dreyer, were entitled to $20,000.00. 3 We see no basis upon 
which the court could remake this so-called agreement for 
either the attorneys or their clients. The court, in effect, 
gave attorneys fees to Dreyer and McCune when it awarded 
their clients punitive damages. It was error to give more 
than this. 
POINT IX 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN 
TAXING CERTAIN COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT UNION 
Over Defendant-Appellant Union's objection, the low-
er court taxed certain costs in favor of Plaintiffs-Respond-
ents. (R. 721). The disputed items related to allowance of 
witness fees and mileage for C. E. Vaughn, Charles C. 
Williams, Jack Berry, George Mitchell, Aubrey Long, Al-
fred Long, W. J. Horne, Joseph Hanley, Joe Long and 
Robert L. ~icElvany. Each of these witnesses attended the 
jury phase of the trial coming from Las Vegas, Nevada. 
(R. 662, 663). The amount allowed Plaintiffs-Respond-
ents for these witnesses and their mileage amounts to 
$598.00 which constitutes an improper allowance. 
All these witnesses appeared voluntarily and without 
subpoena for the Plaintiffs-Respondents. They testified 
3If the judgment below is reversed, as it should be, then Hanley 
and Nance would not, as losing parties, be entitled to an allowance by 
the court of attorneys fees as damages or costs under any concept or 
theory. 
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entirely in connection with the jury trial damage phase of 
Plaintiffs-Respondents' claims. Since the jury rejected 
Plaintiffs-Respondents' claim for damages, it can hardly 
be argued that Plaintiffs-Respondents "prevailed," yet 
the trial judge included the fees for these witnesses in his 
final costs bill allowed. (R. 721). 
Rule 54(d)(1), U.R.C.P. provides: 
''To Whom A warded. Except when express provi-
sion therefore is made either within a statute of this 
state or in this rule, costs shall be awarded as of course 
to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise di-
rects ... " 
21-51-8, U.C.A. 1953 provides: 
''The fees of witnesses paid in civil causes may be 
taxed as costs against the losing party.'' 
While the rule gives the court a wide discretion, al-
lowance of costs to a party whose case has been rejected 
by the jury would constitute an abuse of the court's discre-
tion. There can be little argument that Plaintiffs-Respond-
ents did not prevail and in fact lost the jury trial phase 
of the case. 
Under prior law, in Checketts v. Collings, Utah, 1 P. 2d 
950 ( 1931) it was held that defendant was the prevailing 
party since he defeated plaintiff's cause, inasmuch as the 
jury found that neither the complaint nor the counterclaim 
established a cause of action. Hence, on the entire case, 
the plaintiff lost and the defendant won and thus, the de-
fendant was the prevailing party entitled to judgment and 
to costs. 
Under the present rules of civil procedure, the court 
probably has a wider discretion to divide or apportion 
costs, but certainly not to allow them to a defeated party. 
The Defendant-Appellant Union may not complain that. 
the court failed to award its costs in successfully defend-
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ing the jury phase of this case, but it has grounds to ob-
ject when $598.00 is allowed Plaintiffs-Respondents for a 
case which they lost. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in the brief hereinabove, we 
ask the ~ourt to reverse the decision of the court below, 
and enter judgment for the Defendant-Appellant Union. A 
denial of such relief will, in truth, place labor unions, and 
associations generally, at the mercy of unscrupulous mem-
bers who commit offenses against the law of the society but 
who also refuse to go through the procedures necessary to 
stand trial before duly constituted tribunals of the society. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Of Counsel: 
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405 Executive Building 
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DRAPER, SANDACK & DRAPER 
405 Executive Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
MULHOLLAND, ROBIE & HICKEY 
741 National Bank Building 
Toledo 4, Ohio 
Dated: July 22,1960 
71 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
